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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates inequality, business cycles, and macroeconomic policies.
First, I investigate the quantitative implications of real wage rigidities and heterogeneity
for two long-lasting puzzles in the business cycles literature: the low correlation between total
hours worked and labor productivity and the large volatility of the labor wedge, defined as a
gap between the marginal rate of substitution of aggregate leisure for aggregate consumption
and the marginal product of aggregate labor. I shed light on these issues by extending a
heterogeneous-agent model with an indivisible labor supply choice to real wage rigidities. I
find that a small amount of real wage stickiness would be sufficient to resolve both anomalies
when long-term wage contracts and heterogeneity are taken into account.
Second, I study the heterogeneous responses of consumption between the poor and the
rich to government spending shocks. Government spending shocks have substantially differ-
ent effects on consumers across the income distribution: consumption increases for the poor
whereas it decreases for the rich in response to a rise in government expenditure. I shed light
on this issue by incorporating a progressive tax scheme and productive public expenditure
into a heterogeneous agent model economy with indivisible labor. The model economy is
able to successfully match aggregate and disaggregate effects of government spending shocks
on consumption. When the government increases its spending and accompanies it by a rise
in tax progressivity, the poor are employed and increase their consumption since after-tax
wage rates increase while the rich decrease their consumption because of a fall in after-tax
wage rates.
Third, I also investigate the relation between monetary policy and inequality by asking
how one affects the other: the effect of monetary policy on inequality and the impact of the
long-run level of inequality on the effectiveness of monetary policy. To this end, I incorporate
nominal wage contracts and cash-in-advance constraints into a heterogeneous agent model
economy with indivisible labor. I find that expansionary monetary policy reduces income,
ii
wealth, and consumption inequalities mainly due to a rise in employment from the bottom of
the distributions. There are heterogeneous effects on income across the wealth distribution:
in response to an unanticipated monetary easing, households in the bottom of the wealth
distribution benefit from an increase in employment while rich households benefit from a
rise in the real asset returns in a relative sense. An unexpected monetary expansion also has
asymmetric responses of consumption between the poor and the rich: asset-poor households
increase their consumption while it falls for wealthy households. This implies that inflation
hurts the rich more. I also find that the long-run prevailing levels of inequality matter for
the effectiveness of monetary policy by determining the size of labor supply elasticity, which
represents the shape of reservation wage distribution. All else being equal, a more equal
economy is associated with more effective monetary policy in terms of output. I also provide
empirical evidence for this model result using state-level panel data: the effects of monetary
policy shocks on output are larger for low-inequality states.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The unequal distributions of income and wealth have become a primary concern for
economists and policy makers. Severe inequality is relevant to the implications of household-
level heterogeneity on the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates. In Chapter 2, I study
the quantitative implications of real wage rigidities and heterogeneity for two long-lasting
puzzles in the business cycles literature: the low correlation between total hours worked and
labor productivity and the large volatility of the labor wedge, defined as a gap between the
marginal rate of substitution of aggregate leisure for aggregate consumption and the marginal
product of aggregate labor. I shed light on these issues by extending a heterogeneous-agent
model with an indivisible labor supply choice to real wage rigidities. I find that a small
amount of real wage stickiness would be sufficient to resolve both anomalies when long-term
wage contracts and heterogeneity are taken into account.
In recent years, such inequality is particularly relevant for the stabilization role of eco-
nomic policies since policies might have disparate effects across different segments of the
population. In Chapter 3, I try to explain why government expenditure shocks affect con-
sumers differently using a quantitative analysis based on a heterogeneous agent economy.
By using the Consumer and Expenditure Survey (CEX), I empirically find that government
spending shocks have substantially different impacts on different consumers: consumption
increases for the poor whereas it decreases for the rich in response to a rise in government
expenditure. In order to study the distributional effects of government spending shocks, I in-
corporate a progressive tax scheme and productive public expenditure into a heterogeneous
agent model economy with indivisible labor. The model economy is able to successfully
match aggregate and disaggregate effects of government spending shocks on consumption.
When the government increases its spending and accompanies it by a rise in tax progressiv-
ity, the poor are employed and increase their consumption since after-tax wage rates increase
while the rich decrease their consumption because of a fall in after-tax wage rates.
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In Chapter 4, I investigate the relation between monetary policy and inequality by asking
how one affects the other: the effect of monetary policy on inequality and the impact of the
long-run level of inequality in the effectiveness of monetary policy. To this end, I incorporate
nominal wage contracts and cash-in-advance constraints into a heterogeneous agent model
economy with indivisible labor. I find that expansionary monetary policy reduces income,
wealth, and consumption inequalities mainly due to a rise in employment from the bottom of
the distributions. There are heterogeneous effects on income across the wealth distribution:
in response to an unanticipated monetary easing, households in the bottom of the wealth
distribution benefit from an increase in employment while rich households benefit from a
rise in the real asset returns in a relative sense. An unexpected monetary expansion also has
asymmetric responses of consumption between the poor and the rich: asset-poor households
increase their consumption while it falls for wealthy households. This implies that inflation
hurts the rich more. I also find that the long-run prevailing levels of inequality matter for
the effectiveness of monetary policy by determining the size of of labor supply elasticity,
which represents the shape of reservation wage distribution. All else being equal, a more
equal economy is associated with more effective monetary policy in terms of output. I also
provide empirical evidence for this model result using state-level panel data: the effects of
monetary policy shocks on output are larger for low-inequality states.
2
2. REAL WAGE RIGIDITY, HETEROGENEITY, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLES
2.1 Introduction
Understanding labor market dynamics is important in the business cycle literature since
labor income is a main source of total income; hence, fluctuations in variables related to
labor market may directly affect economic welfare. Although the equilibrium business cycle
models based on the representative agent have had a lot of success in accounting for most
of the stylized facts of business cycles, they cannot account for some important issues re-
garding labor market dynamics. For example, the high volatility of the labor wedge, defined
as a gap between the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure
and the aggregate productivity (or marginal product of labor, MPL), is a well-known puzzle
in the business cycle literature. In addition, the low correlation between aggregate hours
of work and aggregate labor productivity is still an open question. These two puzzles are
central issues in the literature on the real business cycle theory as they are closely related
to welfare costs of the business fluctuations (Gali, Gertler and LopezSalido, 2007; Chang
and Kim, 2007).1 This study addresses both anomalies simultaneously by introducing het-
erogeneity2 and real wage rigidities, which have often been abstracted in the neoclassical
frameworks.3 Once heterogeneity is taken into account, aggregate variables are not deter-
mined by the representative household’s optimality condition, and they are nothing but the
sum of individual variables. In this sense, heterogeneity across economic agents connotes
aggregation bias, and analyzing behaviors of agents at the individual level is crucial to un-
derstand dynamics of the aggregate variables. Chang and Kim (2007), for instance, find that
aggregation errors induced by heterogeneity of individual households endogenously generate
1Gali, Gertler and LopezSalido (2007) show that the wedge can be used as a measure of the lost surplus
in the labor market, and Chang and Kim (2007) argue that the labor wedge may arise because of the low
correlation between hours worked and productivity.
2In this paper, a term “heterogeneity” involves asset market incompleteness.
3Cho and Cooley (1995) incorporate nominal wage contracts into a real business cycle model, while
Krusell and Smith (1998) among others build a heterogeneous-agent model with aggregate productivity
shocks in the context of the neoclassical economies.
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the labor wedge. Besides heterogeneity, according to Gali, Gertler and LopezSalido (2007)
and Shimer (2009), labor market frictions including real wage rigidities are the key factors
for labor market dynamics. However, most of the existing studies on wage stickiness are
based on the representative agent (Cho and Cooley, 1995; Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf, 1997;
Gali, Gertler and LopezSalido, 2007; Uhlig, 2007; Abbritti and Weber, 2010), and there
have been surprisingly few attempts to analyze the implications of real wage rigidities for
the dynamics of labor markets in the context of heterogeneous-agent economies.4 Therefore,
this study explores the quantitative relevance of wage rigidities and heterogeneity for labor
market dynamics focusing on the two enduring anomalies.
To this end, I extend a heterogeneous-agent model with an indivisible labor supply choice
to real wage rigidities. There are three main features in the model economy. First, a house-
hold is assumed to not fully insure against idiosyncratic productivity shocks that she faces:
asset markets are incomplete as in Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). This feature gen-
erates rich heterogeneity across households’ individual characteristics, such as employment,
wealth, income, and consumption. Second, it is assumed that a labor supply decision for
a household is indivisible, following Hansen (1985) and Chang and Kim (2007). It is well-
known that extensive margins of hours worked are important to explain the variation in
total hours of work. Third, the model economy allows for the presence of real wage rigidity
following Gali, Gertler and LopezSalido (2007) and Shimer (2009), who suggest that labor
market frictions including wage rigidities are important explaining the labor wedge. I assume
that wage rigidities arise from wage contracts agreed to by households and firms as in the
work of Cho and Cooley (1995) and Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf (1997).
The main findings of this study are summarized as follows. First, I find that the correla-
tion coefficient between hours and productivity decreases when the index of wage stickiness
or the length of wage contracts increases. This is because hours and productivity no longer
4Benigno and Ricci (2011) investigate the macroeconomic implications of downward nominal wage rigidi-
ties using a model economy with aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Schulz (2015) builds a search and
matching model with heterogeneity and sorting, which endogenously generates wage rigidity.
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move along the labor supply curve due to the wage contract. Heterogeneity also helps explain
the low correlation between two macro variables, since the labor supply curve fluctuates in
response to aggregate shocks (Chang and Kim, 2007). Second, I also find that the volatility
of labor wedge increases with the index of wage rigidity or the wage contract length. More
volatile hours worked and the lower correlation between aggregate hours and productivity,
which are induced by wage rigidity, produce the larger cyclical movement in the labor wedge.5
Heterogeneity also plays a role in accounting for the large volatile wedge since the wedge
is endogenously generated when heterogeneity is taken into account. From these findings, I
conclude that a small amount of real wage rigidity would be enough to resolve both puzzles
when long-term wage contracts and heterogeneity are considered.
A large body of literature has provided various explanations for the low correlation be-
tween hours and productivity and the large volatile wedge. Key contributions are Ben-
habib, Rogerson and Wright (1991), Cho and Cooley (1995), Hall (1997), Gali, Gertler and
LopezSalido (2007) and Shimer (2009). Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) and Hall
(1997) consider exogenous shocks to the labor supply schedule for an explanation for the
puzzles. Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) incorporate home production technology
into a standard real business cycle framework, while Hall (1997) analyzes preference shifts
as an exogenous shock to the labor supply curve. Cho and Cooley (1995) incorporate nomi-
nal wage contracts and monetary shocks into a real business cycle (RBC) model, and their
model can generate the low correlation between hours and productivity. Other important
works on the labor wedge are Gali, Gertler and LopezSalido (2007) and Shimer (2009). Gali,
Gertler and LopezSalido (2007) study the efficiency gap (the labor wedge) as a measure of
the welfare costs in the labor market based on a New Keynesian model economy and find
that labor market frictions are the key factor for the gap. Furthermore, Shimer (2009) finds
that search frictions combined with real wage stickiness endogenously produce the labor
5An indivisible labor decision plays a significant role in breaking the tight link between consumption and
labor at both individual and aggregate levels, which also affects the volatility of the labor wedge (Chang and
Kim, 2007).
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wedge. All these papers are based on the representative-agent economy. I contribute to this
literature by developing a model with heterogeneous agents to account for the two anomalies
as in Chang and Kim (2007) and Takahashi (2014).
This study is also closely related and complementary to a chain of quantitative papers
based on a heterogeneous-agent model for the two puzzles. Chang and Kim (2007) pro-
vide one of the first frameworks linking heterogeneity to the labor wedge. They develop a
model economy of incomplete capital markets with discrete labor supply and idiosyncratic
labor productivity shocks, and show that the measured labor wedge arises endogenously
due to rich heterogeneity across agents and incomplete markets.6 Takahashi (2015) builds a
heterogeneous-agent DSGE model in the presence of time-varying wage risks. He finds that
fluctuations in idiosyncratic wage risks resolve the hours-productivity puzzle and the large
cyclical movement in the wedge. Differentiating from Chang and Kim (2007) and Takahashi
(2014), the main contribution of this article is that I explicitly consider real wage rigidities,
including long-term wage contracts, in a heterogeneous-agent DSGE model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the two puzzles
using U.S. aggregate data. In Section 3, I will build an incomplete asset market model
with real wage rigidities and heterogeneous agents. The parameter values are determined
in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the findings of the model economies. In Section 6, I
examine the role of heterogeneity in the two anomalies. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Facts: Two Puzzles
In this section, I summarize empirical evidence regarding the two puzzles using U.S. ag-
gregate data spanning from 1964:I to 2011:IV. Other than total hours of work, U.S. macroe-
conomic data used in this paper are standard as in the business cycle literature.7 Since I
believe that choosing a measure for hours worked is most important to compute reliable
6Takahashi (2014) finds that there are errors in the computational method of Chang and Kim (2007),
and their model economy actually generates the strong correlation between productivity and hours and the
less volatile labor wedge.
7See Subsection A1 in the appendix below for details of the data sources.
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aggregate productivity and the labor wedge, I use two types of datasets for hours of work:
the household survey (HS) and the establishment survey (ES).8 The establishment survey is
taken from the Current Employment Statistics (CES), which is conducted by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). The source for the household-level survey data is Cociuba, Prescott
and Ueberfeldt (2009). They use the Consumer Population Survey (CPS) to compute total
hours worked.
2.2.1 Puzzle 1: Low Correlation between Productivity and Hours
The relation between the aggregate labor productivity and aggregate hours is summarized
in Figure 2.1. The aggregate labor productivity is computed as Y/H where Y is real gross
domestic production (GDP) in the private business sector, and H is aggregate hours of work.
The upper panel of Figure 2.1 exhibits the correlation between productivity and hours, which
are computed with the household survey. As observed in the scatter plot in the top left panel,
productivity does not seem to be correlated with hours. The correlation coefficient between
the two macro variables is very small (0.23). The consistent pattern is also seen in the
upper right panel, which shows that the cyclical components of productivity and hours over
long periods of time. Hours often fluctuate in the opposite direction to productivity, which
may cause the low correlation between the two time series. A similar relationship is also
found in the bottom panel of Figure 2.1, where productivity and hours are computed using
the establishment survey. The correlation coefficient between the two variables with the
establishment survey is -0.06.
2.2.2 Puzzle 2: Large Volatile Labor Wedge
Following Chang and Kim (2007) and others, the labor wedge is defined as the gap
between the marginal rate of substitution of aggregate leisure for aggregate consumption
(MRS) and the marginal product of aggregate labor (MPL), i.e.,
8Similarly, Karabarbounis (2014) also uses both the household-level and the establishment-level survey
data for hours of work when he computes the labor wedge.
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Figure 2.1: Hours and Productivity
Notes: All variables are logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600.
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Figure 2.2: Hours and Labor Wedge
Notes: The labor wedge is computed from Equation (4.10). All variables are logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600.
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log(wedge) = log(CH
1
χ )− log(Y/H) (2.1)
where C is aggregate expenditures on nondurable goods and services, and χ is aggregate
labor supply elasticity.9 MRS(= CH
1
χ ) is derived from the functional form of household’s
utility which will be discussed in Section 3. Figure 2.2 exhibits the relation between ag-
gregate hours and the labor wedge. Regardless of what survey data I use, the correlation
coefficient of the wedge with hours of work is high: 0.82 (0.90) in the household survey (in
the establishment survey). More importantly, the labor wedge is highly volatile. The rela-
tive volatility of the wedge to Y is 0.86 (1.08) in the household survey (in the establishment
survey), which is larger than that of aggregate hours of work, 0.72 (0.89). These findings
are consistent with previous work, such as that of Chang and Kim (2007), Takahashi (2014)
and Karabarbounis (2014).
To sum up, the correlation between aggregate productivity and hours worked is low
and the labor wedge is large volatile. As discussed in Chang and Kim (2007), these two
facts are closely related. According to Equation (4.10), the labor wedge arises since hours
worked and productivity show a fairly low correlation. In the next section, I present a DSGE
model economy with heterogeneous households and real wage rigidities to account for the
two puzzles.
2.3 The Model
I build a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a large
population of heterogeneous households in labor productivity and with real wage rigidities.
It is assumed that households cannot fully insure against individual productivity shocks,
which follow a stochastic process. That is, capital markets are incomplete following Huggett
9It should be noted that micro labor supply elasticity is calibrated but the macro elasticity of labor supply
is endogenously generated due to heterogeneity and indivisibility of labor supply. I choose χ = 1.5, which
is computed from steady state reservation wage distribution generated by the baseline model economy. The
value is in the range of the estimates for the aggregate labor supply elasticity in the macro-labor literature.
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(1993) and Aiyagari (1994). A labor supply decision for each household is assumed to be
indivisible as in Hansen (1985) and Chang and Kim (2007). In particular, the model economy
allows for the presence of real wage rigidities following Gali, Gertler and LopezSalido (2007)
and Shimer (2009), who argue that labor market frictions, including real wage stickiness, are
key factors for the labor wedge. As in Cho and Cooley (1995) and Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf
(1997), real wage rigidities arise from wage contracts agreed to by households and firms. In
these senses, the model economy in this paper is an extended version of Chang and Kim
(2007), who feature extensive margins of labor supply in a heterogeneous-agent model. It
is also in line with Cho and Cooley (1995), Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf (1997), Gali, Gertler
and LopezSalido (2007), and Shimer (2009) in that wage rigidities are explicitly considered
in the model economy.
2.3.1 Real Wage Contracts
In this subsection, I discuss the wage contract rule. Related papers are Cho and Cooley
(1995), Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf (1997), Janko (2007), and Janko (2008). It is assumed that
real wage rigidities arise from wage contracts agreed to by households and firms. Consider a
k-period wage contact, and suppose that the firms and the households are in period of t−k.
I use a natural formulation of the contract wages as a weighted average of the expected wage
and the spot wage. As in Janko (2007), wage contracts are partially set in a synchronized
manner: the expected wages for period t − k + 1 to t are determined at the end of period
t − k, while the spot wage is determined in each period. Additionally, similar to Cho and
Cooley (1995), I assume that both expected and spot wages are based on the forecasting
function for wage rates and the law of motion for aggregate capital from the economy with
no wage rigidities. Specifically, following Chang and Kim (2007), the law of motion for the
aggregate capital, K, and the forecasting function for the market wage rate are assumed to
take log-linear functions of K and aggregate productivity, Z:10
10For an equilibrium with aggregate dynamics, I follow the procedure suggested Krusell and Smith (1998):
a very high precision can be obtained by approximating the distribution across characteristics of households
(µ) using the first moment of it. Hence, the mean asset, K, is used in forecasting the law of motion for µ.
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logKt+1 = a0 + a1 logKt + a2 logZt, (2.2)
logwt = b0 + b1 logKt + b2 logZt. (2.3)
The coefficients for the law of motion and the forecasting function can be obtained from
the market clearing economy, where there are no wage rigidities. The aggregate productivity,
Z, follows an AR(1) process in logs:
logZt+1 = ρZ logZt + εt+1, εt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2Z). (2.4)
Suppose that the firms and the households are in period of t− k + j, where j is defined
as follows:
j =

q for q > 0
k for q = 0
, (2.5)
where q is the remainder after division of t by k.11 wet−k+j, which is the expected wage
rate in period t− k+ j conditional on the information available in period t− k, is computed
as expected value of Equation (3.2) such that:
logwet−k+j = E [b0 + b1 logKt−k+j + b2 logZt−k+j|Ωt−k] , (2.6)
where Ωt−k ≡ (Kt−k, Zt−k). Hence, the expected wages for k successive periods are set
simultaneously at the end of period t− k. Next, following Cho and Cooley (1995), I assume
11Hence, 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
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that wst−k+j, which is the wage rate determined in the spot market in period t − k + j, is
defined as:
logwst−k+j = b0 + b1 logKt−k+j + b2 logZt−k+j. (2.7)
That is, the spot wages are also determined using Equation (3.4) but based on the
current information.12 Finally, wct−k+j, which is the contract wage rate in period t − k + j,
is determined as a weighted average of wet−k+j and wst−k+j:
wct−k+j = λwet−k+j + (1− λ)wst−k+j, (2.8)
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is the index of real wage rigidity.
According to Equation (3.1) and (3.2), wet−k+j is expressed by the function of Kt−k and
Zt−k, and wst−k+j is determined by the current state variables (Kt−k+j and Zt−k+j). Thus, the
contract wage rate, wct−k+j, is a function of four aggregate variables of Kt−k, Zt−k, Kt−k+j,
and Zt−k+j. Intuitively, the contract wage depends on two parameters: the degree of wage
rigidity, λ, and the length of wage contracts, k.
2.3.2 Representative Firm
The production technology for the representative firm is represented by the constant
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function:
F (K,L, Z)≡ZKθL1−θ,
where K, L and θ denote aggregate capital, aggregate effective labor, capital income
share, respectively. Following Cho and Cooley (1995) and Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf (1997),
12If there is no wage rigidity in the model economy, the spot wage is the same as the market equilibrium
wage.
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given the wage contract rule, it is assumed that the representative firm decides how much
aggregate effective labor it demands. In other words, the households cede the right to
make decisions about aggregate labor to the firm. Hence, given the contract wage rate, the
aggregate effective labor L is determined by firm’s profit maximization condition. Of course,
given wc and the real rental price for capital r, the demand for capital is also determined by
the first-order conditions. That is,
wc = (1− θ)Z(K/L)θ,
and
r + δ = θZ(K/L)θ−1,
where δ is the capital depreciation rate.
2.3.3 Heterogeneous Households
Each household maximizes the expected lifetime utility:
E
 ∞∑
t=0
βt
log ct −Ψ h1+1/ηt1 + 1/η
 ,
where 0 < β < 1 is the time discount factor, ct is consumption, ht is hours of work,
Ψ > 0 is a parameter for disutility from working, and η is micro Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. A labor choice by each household is assumed to be indivisible following Hansen
(1985), Rogerson (1988), and Chang and Kim (2007). In other words, a household makes a
decision to work for a fixed amount of hours (h = h) or none (h = 0). Accordingly, there are
two occupational choices in the model economy: an employed worker and a non-employed
worker.
It is assumed that households face idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks, x, which
evolves with transition probabilities Px(x′|x) = Pr(xt+1 = x′|xt = x). Asset markets are
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incomplete following Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994): households cannot issue any assets
contingent on their future idiosyncratic risks, x. Borrowing is allowed for a household, but
it is exogenous amount, a. I assume that the aggregate shocks and the individual shocks
are independent of each other. In addition, the idiosyncratic risks are assumed to follow a
log-AR(1) process:
log x′ = ρx log x+ εx, εx ∼ N(0, σx2).
Suppose that a household is in period t − k + j, where j is defined in Equation (3.5).
For each household, the individual state is the vector γ ≡ (a, x), where a denotes assets that
a household holds. As mentioned above, since wct−k+j is a function of µt−k, Zt−k, µt−k+j,
and Zt−k+j, the aggregate state is the vector Γ ≡ (µ, Z, µ−k, Z−k, j), where µ is a joint
distribution of assets and idiosyncratic labor productivity across households, and Z−k(µ−k)
is aggregate productivity shock (the joint distribution) in period of t − k.13 Notice that
the future aggregate state is the vector Γ′ ≡ (µ′, Z ′, µ−k, Z−k, j + 1) when j < k since the
household’s expectation is still based on information in period of t− k, while it is the vector
Γ′ ≡ (µ′, Z ′, µ, Z, 1) when j = k since, in period t + 1, the base period for the expectation
will change from period of t− k to period of t.
2.3.3.1 Employment Decision
Since households agree to cede the right to decide an aggregate efficient labor to the
representative firm, they should provide effective labor that the firm demands, denoted by
Lc, hereafter. If the economy is based on the representative-agent assumption, all identical
households should supply the same amount of labor, Lc. However, in the heterogeneous-
agent model economy, since each household has a different reservation wage, it is needed
to have an additional assumption how different households allocate their hours differently
to fulfill the wage contract. Hence, I assume that households are employed in ascending
order by their reservation wage rates until they provide Lc. Specifically, suppose that w˜
13Following Krusell and Smith (1998), µ will be approximated by K.
15
is the wage rate at which households endogenously provide effective labor of Lc given the
aggregate state variables. A household, whose reservation wage rate is less than or equal to
w˜, should work. In other words, households make labor supply decisions under w˜. Thus,
even if employment decisions are made endogenously under w˜, some are voluntarily (non-
)employed while others are involuntarily (non-)employed because of the wage contracts. Of
course, the size of the involuntary labor choices depends on the degree of wage rigidity or
the length of wage contracts.
Let’s consider a recursive equilibrium to charaterize w˜ and labor supply choices for house-
holds, h(γ,Γ). The value function for an employed worker V˜ W (γ,Γ), is:
V˜ W (γ,Γ) = maxc,a′
{
log c−Ψh1+1/η1+1/η + βE
[
V˜ (γ′,Γ′)
]}
subject to
c = w˜xh+ (1 + r)a− a′, c ≥ 0, a′ ≥ a,
and
µ′ = Θ(Γ),
where Θ denotes a transition operator for µ, and a is a borrowing constrain that limits
the fixed amount of debt.
The value function for a non-employed worker, denoted by V˜ N(γ,Γ), is:
V˜ N(γ,Γ) = maxc,a′
{
log c+ βE
[
V˜ (γ′,Γ′)
]}
subject to
c = (1 + r)a− a′, c ≥ 0, a′ ≥ a and µ′ = Θ(Γ).
The household’s employment decision h(γ,Γ) ∈
{
0, h
}
and value function V˜ (γ,Γ) are
defined as:
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V˜ (γ,Γ) = maxh∈{0,h}
{
V˜ W (γ,Γ), V˜ N(γ,Γ)
}
.
Of course, for all Γ, households provide Lc(Γ) under w˜:
Lc(Γ) =
∫
xh(γ,Γ)dµ.
2.3.3.2 Consumption-savings Decision
The next step of a decision for a household is a consumption-investment decision. Given
employment status h(γ,Γ), decisions for consumption and savings are made under the con-
tract wage wc such that:
V (γ,Γ) = maxc,a′
{
log c−Ψh(γ,Γ)1+1/η1+1/η + βE [V (γ′,Γ′)]
}
subject to
c = wcxh(γ,Γ) + (1 + r)a, c ≥ 0, a′ ≥ a and µ′ = Θ(Γ).
To sum up, employment decisions are made under w˜ to supply the labor the firm demands,
while consumption-investment decisions are under wc. Notice that the real return to capital,
r, is the same for the two decisions.
2.3.4 Definition of Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of inputs {K(Γ), Lc(Γ)} , a set of factor pricing
functions {wc(Γ), r(Γ), w˜(Γ)}, a set of value functions {V˜ W (γ,Γ),V˜ N(γ,Γ),V˜ (γ,Γ),V (γ,Γ)},
a set of optimal decision rules {h(γ,Γ), c(γ,Γ), a′(γ,Γ)}, and a forecasting function Θ(Γ) such
that:
1. Real wage contracts
2. Employment decisions: given w˜(Γ) and r(Γ), the optimal employment decision rule
h(γ,Γ) solves the value functions V˜ W (γ,Γ),V˜ N(γ,Γ) and V˜ (γ,Γ).
3. Consumption-saving decisions: given h(γ,Γ), wc(Γ) and r(Γ), the optimal decision
rules c(γ,Γ) and a′(γ,Γ) solve the value function V (γ,Γ).
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4. The firms optimize: for all Γ, FL(K(Γ),Lc(Γ), Z) = wc(Γ) and FK(K(Γ), Lc(Γ, Z) =
r(Γ) + δ.
5. Capital markets clear: for all Γ, K(Γ) =
∫
adµ.
6. Aggregate behaviors are consistent with individual ones: Θ(Γ) is consistent with the
actual law of motion implied by the optimal policy function a′(γ,Γ).
2.4 Calibration
Table 4.1 summarizes parameter values used in the model economies. The parameter η,
which corresponds to the micro elasticity of labor supply, is set to 0.4 based on the findings
that estimates of the micro elasticity of labor supply are around 0 − 0.5. However, since a
labor supply decision is discrete, choosing any values of η does not affect simulation results.
An extensive margin for the labor supply, h, is chosen to be 1/3. I choose the time discount
factor, β, and the disutility parameter of working, Ψ, to target a one percent quarterly
return to capital and a 60 percent employment rate for employed workers.14 The borrowing
constraint, a, is set to −2.0, following Chang and Kim (2007).15
For the individual labor productivity shock process, I choose ρx = 0.929 and σx = 0.227
following Chang and Kim (2007) which is estimated with the AR(1) wage process using the
PSID for 1979-1992.16 For aggregate productivity shocks, I simply choose ρz = 0.95 and
σz = 0.007 following Kydland and Prescott (1982). The capital income share, θ, is 0.36,
and the quarterly depreciation rate, δ, is 2.5 percent. Unfortunately, there is little empirical
evidence on the index of real wage rigidity, given the wage contract rule. Hence, I choose a
set of values for λ, which are 0, 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7. As far as the length of wage contracts, k,
is concerned, I consider one-, four- and eight-period contracts, i.e., k =1, 4, and 8.
14Recent U.S. data such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) consistently report that the employment rates are around 60 percent.
15−a(= 2) is around doubled quarterly average income of the model.
16Chang and Kim (2007) estimate the AR(1) process of the logged wage rate using the maximum-likelihood
estimation (MLE) method of Heckman (1979) to fix the selection bias problem, where the wages of households
who did not work are not observable in the data.
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Table 2.1: Parameters of the Model Economy
Parameter Value Description
β 0.983125 Time discount factor
h 1/3 Extensive margin for hours worked
η 0.4 Labor supply elasticity
Ψ 166.2 Parameter for disutility from working
ρx 0.929 Persistence of productivity shocks
σx 0.227 Standard deviation of productivity shocks
a -2.0 Borrowing constraint
θ 0.36 Capital income share
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
ρZ 0.95 Persistence of aggregate productivity shock
σZ 0.007 Standard deviation of innovation to aggregate productivity
2.5 Findings
2.5.1 One-period Wage Contract Case
As a benchmark case, I first summarize the key findings of the model economy with
one-period wage contract (k = 1) to study the role of wage rigidity indexes, λ.
2.5.1.1 Wage Rigidity and Hours-Productivity Correlation
The cyclical properties of the aggregate variables for model economies are summarized
in Table 2.2. Comovements between output and other key variables, such as consumption
and investment, are well replicated in all the model economies as in the standard RBC
models. The main focus in this paper is on variables related to labor markets. Table 2.2 and
Figure 2.3 show that the correlation coefficient of hours and productivity decreases as the
index of wage stickiness increases. The correlation coefficient of the two macro series in the
model economies when λ = 0.3 and λ = 0.7 are 0.20 and -0.55, respectively, while it is 0.81
in the market clearing economy (λ = 0). Thus, the model economies with small amounts
of wage stickiness reproduce reasonably well the fact that hours of work are not strongly
correlated with productivity. The intuition is simple. During expansions, the aggregate
labor demand curve shifts to the right, but the contract wage and hours are not determined
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Table 2.2: Cyclicality of Aggregate Variables
Variable Data (HS) Data (ES) λ = 0 λ = 0.3 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.7
ρ(Y,C) 0.81 0.81 0.91 0.87 0.83 0.79
ρ(Y, I) 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
ρ(Y,H) 0.84 0.86 0.96 0.89 0.87 0.87
ρ(H, Y/H) 0.23 -0.06 0.81 0.20 -0.28 -0.55
ρ(H,wedge) 0.82 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.98
Notes: The labor wedge is computed from Equation (4.10). All variables are logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600. ρ(A,B) denotes the correlation between variables A and B. HS and ES denote the
household survey and the establishment survey, respectively.
at an intersection between the labor supply and demand curves due to the wage contract.
Hence, wage rigidities prevent the wage and hours from moving together along the labor
supply curve with aggregate shocks.
2.5.1.2 Wage Rigidity and Volatility of Labor Wedge
Table 2.3 reports the volatilities of the aggregate variables for the U.S. economy and
the corresponding variables simulated by model economies. The model economy without
wage rigidities (the market clearing economy) shows output volatility of 1.26, explaining
around 60 percent of cyclical variation of output in the U.S. data. The model economies
with wage rigidities exhibit larger output variation: the volatility of output is 1.40 when
λ = 0.3 and 1.67 when λ = 0.7. Sample statistics of other variables are similar to those in
the standard RBC models: consumption and investment is around 30-40 percent and three
times as volatile as output, respectively.
A distinguishing feature of the model economy is the labor wedge. The wage stickiness
plays an important role in generating the large volatile wedge. According to Table 2.3 and
Figure 2.3, the volatility of the wedge increases with the degree of wage stickiness: the
volatilities of the wedge relative to output in the model economies when λ = 0.3 and λ = 0.7
are 0.66 and 1.27, respectively. However, the market clearing model economy fails to replicate
the cyclical variation of the labor wedge in the U.S. economy: relative volatility of the wedge
is 0.23 when λ = 0. According to Equation (4.10), the volatility of wedge is positively related
20
-2 -1 0 1 2
-2
-1
0
1
2
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 = 0
-2 -1 0 1 2
-2
-1
0
1
2
 = 0.3
-2 -1 0 1 2
Hours
-2
-1
0
1
2
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 = 0.5
-2 -1 0 1 2
Hours
-2
-1
0
1
2
 = 0.7
Figure 2.3: Correlation between Productivity and Hours
Variables are logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600 for each λ.
Table 2.3: Volatilities of Aggregate Variables
Variable Data (HS) Data (ES) λ = 0 λ = 0.3 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.7
σY 2.11 2.11 1.26 1.40 1.53 1.67
σC/σY 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.29
σI/σY 2.67 2.67 3.00 3.11 3.20 3.28
σH/σY 0.72 0.89 0.54 0.79 1.01 1.20
σY/H/σY 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.59
σwedge/σY 0.86 1.08 0.23 0.66 1.00 1.27
Notes: The labor wedge is computed from Equation (4.10). All variables are logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600. σA denotes the standard deviation (multiplied by 100) of a variable A. HS and ES
denote the household survey and the establishment survey, respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Volatility of Labor Wedge
The labor wedge is computed from Equation (4.10). The series is logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a
smoothing parameter of 1,600 for each λ.
to the cyclical movement in hours worked (H) and the volatility of productivity (Y/H), and
negatively related to the correlation between hours and productivity. Firstly, the relative
volatility of aggregate hours worked gets larger with the degree of wage rigidity: the cyclical
variation of hours of work relative to output is 0.54 and 1.20 with wage rigidity indexes of
0.3 and 0.7, respectively. Second, interestingly, there are small differences in the cyclical
variation of productivity relative to output across model economies with different λ. Lastly,
as found earlier in Table 2.2, the correlation between hours and productivity decreases as the
index of wage rigidity increases. From the three findings above, I conclude that large volatile
hours worked and the low correlation coefficient between hours and productivity produce
the large cyclical movement in the wedge.17
17The correlation coefficient of the wedge with aggregate hours worked is also reasonably replicated: it is
large in the model economies as in the U.S. data (see Table 2.2).
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Table 2.4: Volatilities and Cyclicality of Aggregate Variables: Long-period Wage Contracts
Variable Data (HS) Data (ES) k = 0 k = 1 k = 4 k = 8
σY 2.11 2.11 1.26 1.40 1.56 1.69
σC/σY 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.30
σI/σY 2.67 2.67 3.00 3.11 3.20 3.27
σH/σY 0.72 0.89 0.54 0.79 0.97 1.06
σY/H/σY 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.41
σwedge/σY 0.86 1.08 0.23 0.66 0.90 1.01
ρ(Y,C) 0.81 0.81 0.91 0.87 0.83 0.80
ρ(Y, I) 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98
ρ(Y,H) 0.84 0.86 0.96 0.89 0.91 0.92
ρ(H, Y/H) 0.23 -0.06 0.81 0.20 -0.15 -0.33
ρ(H,wedge) 0.82 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.98
Notes: All variables are logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600. σA denotes
the standard deviation (multiplied by 100) of a variable A and ρ(A,B) denotes the correlation between variables A and B. HS
and ES denote the household survey and the establishment survey, respectively. λ = 0.3 for all k other than k = 0. k = 0
denotes the absence of wage rigidities in the model economy.
2.5.2 Multi-period Wage Contract Case
In the benchmark case above, the length of wage contracts is a quarter. However, in
reality, the contract periods are much longer: four or eight quarters. Hence, I examine how
the cyclical behavior of the economy varies with the length of the wage contracts, focusing on
the two puzzles. In fact, the long-term wage contracts play a significant role in accounting for
the business cycle properties of the economy. For example, Cho and Cooley (1995) find that
the length of wage contracts is important in the cyclical variation of aggregate variables.
Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf (1997) also quantitatively estimate the welfare cost of nominal
wage contracting across the contract periods and find that the welfare costs can vary over
the contract length.
Summary statistics of the aggregate variables simulated by model economies over contract
periods are summarized in Table 2.4. Given the wage rigidity index (λ = 0.3), the longer
wage contract periods generate the larger volatile labor wedge and the lower correlation
coefficients between productivity and hours. The relative volatility of the labor wedge is
0.90 in the four-period wage contract and around one in the eight-period wage contract,
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Table 2.5: Required Index of Wage Rigidity to Replicate the U.S. Data
Four-period Contract Eight-period Contract
ρ(H,Y/H) 0.26 0.22
σwedge/σY 0.35 0.29
Notes: The labor wedge is computed from Equation (4.10). All variables are logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600.
while it is 0.66 in the short-term wage contract rule (k = 1). The correlation coefficients
between productivity and hours in the long-term wage contracts are small negative numbers,
while the correlation is 0.20 in the short-term wage contract. These results imply that the
length of wage contracts plays a role in implicitly generating stickier wages.
Next, an interesting question is how large index of wage stickiness is required to solve the
two puzzles when long-term wage contracts are considered. Table 2.5 reports the required
degree of the wage stickiness to reproduce the correlation between hours and productivity
and the relative volatility of the labor wedge of the U.S. economy.18 According to the upper
panel of the Table 2.5, the required index of wage rigidity is around 0.20 − 0.25 to obtain
the zero correlation coefficient. As far as the volatility of the labor wedge is concerned, the
second row of the Table 2.5 suggests that around 0.30 − 0.35 of the wage rigidity index is
needed to replicate the average of the volatility of the wedge relative to output in the U.S
economy, which is around one. Therefore, I argue that a small amount of real wage rigidity
would be enough to reproduce the low correlation between productivity and hours and the
large volatility of the labor wedge when the long-term wage contracts are considered in the
heterogeneous-agent model. These findings are consistent with empirical work on real wage
rigidity supporting the evidence that the degree of real wage rigidity in the U.S. is small
(Dickens et al., 2007; Holden and Wulfsberg, 2009; Deelen and Verbeek, 2015).19
18I use the cubic spline interpolation method to approximate the relative volatility of the labor wedge
and the correlation between hours and productivity with five grid points for λ. Then I compute the required
λ which replicates the U.S. data.
19These results are also in line with work of Cho and Cooley (1995), who show that output volatility
measured in the U.S. data is replicated with a very small amount of wage rigidity when a long-term wage
contract is considered.
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2.6 Role of Heterogeneity
In some previous related work based on the representative-agent (RA) economies, the
labor wedge arises when other features are introduced into the model economy (Benhabib,
Rogerson and Wright, 1991; Hall, 1997; Gali, Gertler and LopezSalido, 2007; Shimer, 2009).
Not only that, previous work in the context of the representative-agent models with wage
rigidity—Cho and Cooley (1995) for example—has also successfully reproduced the fact that
hours of work are not highly correlated with labor productivity.20 Therefore, it seems natural
to ask why heterogeneity is necessary and what the role of heterogeneity is in the two puzzles.
To investigate the importance of heterogeneity for resolving the two anomalies, I compare
the key business cycle properties of the representative- and heterogeneous-agent (HA) model
economy, controlling for wage rigidities. The basic assumptions for the wage contacts in the
RA model are the same as those in the HA model other than the employment decisions for
households. Since households are identical in the RA model, they cannot decide who works
or not as in the HA model. Hence, given the contract wage, the representative household is
assumed to provide Lc, which is determined by firm’s profit maximization condition.21 For
calibration in the RA model, I choose β = 0.99 to target a one percent quarterly return to
capital, and I set the disutility parameter of working, Ψ, to match the aggregate hours of
0.2. Importantly, the labor supply elasticity, η, is chosen to be 1.5, which is the same as the
aggregate labor supply elasticity generated by the HA model.22 Other remaining parameters
are the same as those in the HA model.
Summary statistics of the aggregate variables simulated by the RA model economies
over the indexes of wage rigidity and the length of wage contracts are summarized in Table
2.6. As in the HA model economy, in the RA model, the correlation coefficient of hours
20Cho and Cooley (1995) yield a very small correlation between productivity and hours using a model
with nominal wage contracts and monetary shocks.
21The RA model in this paper is similar to the model of Cho and Cooley (1995), but Cho and Cooley
(1995) consider nominal wage rigidities with monetary policies while this work introduces real wage rigidities
without nominal shocks.
22In a heterogeneous-agent model economy with indivisible labor, macro labor supply elasticity can be
computed from steady state reservation wage distribution. See Chang and Kim (2006) for details.
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Table 2.6: Volatilities and Cyclicality of Aggregate Variables: RA Model
Variable λ = 0 λ = 0.3 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.7 k = 4 k = 8
σY 1.27 1.39 1.51 1.64 1.54 1.65
σC/σY 0.35 0.55 0.64 0.73 0.51 0.49
σI/σY 3.00 2.41 2.21 2.02 2.65 2.75
σH/σY 0.42 0.60 0.73 0.84 0.70 0.75
σY/H/σY 0.60 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.38
σwedge/σY 0.00 0.66 0.98 1.25 0.70 0.74
ρ(Y,C) 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.87
ρ(Y, I) 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.97
ρ(Y,H) 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.95
ρ(H,Y/H) 0.95 0.65 0.40 0.17 0.55 0.52
ρ(H,wedge) 0.00 0.90 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.93
Notes: All variables are logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600. σA denotes
the standard deviation (multiplied by 100) of a variable A and ρ(A,B) denotes the correlation between variables A and B.
k = 1 for all λ other than λ = 0, and λ = 0.3 for all k.
and productivity decreases, and the volatility of the wedge increases as the degree of wage
stickiness or the length of wage contracts increases. However, the effect of wage stickiness is
much less in the RA model. For example, when λ = 0.3 with k = 4, in the RA model, the
volatility of the wedge is 0.70, and the correlation of hours and productivity is 0.55, while
they are 0.95 and -0.15, respectively, in the HA model economy. Not only that, according
to Table 2.7, the required degree of the wage stickiness under the RA model with long-
term wage contracts, which is able to reproduce the two key business cycle moments of the
U.S. economy, is around 0.5 − 0.7, whereas it is around 0.20 − 0.35 in the HA model as
in Table 2.5. From these counterfactual analyses, I conclude that heterogeneity plays an
important role in solving the two puzzles. First, heterogeneity allows the labor supply curve
to evolve over time since reservation wage distribution or wealth distribution is time-varying
in response to the aggregate shocks in the presence of heterogeneity (Chang and Kim, 2007).
As a result, heterogeneity also plays a role in breaking the positive linear relation between
productivity and hours and, in turn, generate the low correlation between the two time series.
Furthermore, as found in Chang and Kim (2007), the labor wedge arises endogenously in the
presence of heterogeneity. Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3 present that the volatility of the wedge is
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Table 2.7: Required Index of Wage Rigidity to Replicate the U.S. Data: RA Model
Four-period Contract Eight-period Contract
ρ(H,Y/H) 0.65 0.57
σwedge/σY 0.50 0.46
Notes: The labor wedge is computed from Equation (4.10). All variables are logged and detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600.
positive in the HA model even if there is no wage rigidity in the labor market (λ = 0), while
it is zero in the RA model when λ = 0.23 As mentioned above, the empirical evidence, found
by Dickens et al. (2007), Holden and Wulfsberg (2009), and Deelen and Verbeek (2015),
suggests that the size of real wage rigidity in the U.S. economy is small. Therefore, I argue
that the HA model with wage rigidities is compatible with the empirical findings while the
RA model may not.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the quantitative implications of real wage rigidities and heterogeneity
for the two long-standing puzzles in the business cycles literature, the weak comovement of
hours worked with labor productivity and the large cyclical movement in the labor wedge.
I shed light on these issues by extending a heterogeneous-agent model with an indivisible
labor supply choice to real wage rigidities.
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. I find that the correlation
coefficient between hours and productivity decreases, and the volatility of the labor wedge
increases when the index of wage stickiness or the length of wage contracts increases. Hetero-
geneity also plays a role in solving the two puzzles since heterogeneity allows the aggregate
labor supply curve to move in response to aggregate productivity shocks and the wedge to
be endogenously produced. From these results, I argue that a small amount of real wage
stickiness would be sufficient to resolve both anomalies when long-term wage contracts and
heterogeneity are taken into account.
23Of course, the indivisibility of a labor decision also helps to solve the puzzles. See Chang and Kim
(2007) for the role of the indivisible labor.
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3. THE HETEROGENEOUS RESPONSES OF CONSUMPTION BETWEEN POOR
AND RICH TO GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS∗
3.1 Introduction
Understanding how government spending shocks affect an economy is important since
fiscal instruments are often used to smooth economic fluctuations, and they may directly
affect consumers’ welfare. Existing papers in the literature have devoted a great deal of
effort to finding the effects of government expenditure on real economic activity.1 However,
most of them have mainly focused on how government spending affects macro variables, such
as aggregate output, consumption, and employment. In addition to the aggregate effects of
a public spending shock, the distributional effects are also a central issue in public debates,
when considering increasing concerns about economic inequality. Accounting for this issue
is also of importance to the discussion of economic policies since it is closely related to
stabilization and redistributive policies.
In fact, government spending shocks have substantially different impacts on different
consumers. Figure 3.1 exhibits the responses of average non-durable consumption across
income quintiles to government spending shocks using the Consumer and Expenditure Survey
(CEX), which spans from the first quarter of 1980 to the third quarter of 2008.2 I use the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) forecast errors to identify government spending
policy shocks following Ramey (2011) and Anderson, Inoue and Rossi (2016).3 In order
to study the effects of a government spending shock, I consider a three-variable Vector
∗This chapter is reprinted with permission from "The Heterogeneous Responses of Consumption between
Poor and Rich to Government Spending Shocks" by Eunseong Ma. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
(forthcoming), Copyright [2000-2019] by John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
1For example, empirical studies such as Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles
(2007) and Zubairy (2010) find significantly positive responses of output and consumption to an increase in
government spending.
2I exclude zero lower bound (ZLB) periods and onward, but I find that estimation results for the full
sample (1980:I-2015:III) are still robust. See appendix for details.
3The measure of SPF forecast errors is defined as the difference between actual federal spending growth
and the one-quarter-ahead SPF forecasted growth.
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Figure 3.1: Responses of Consumption across Income Quintiles
Note: Responses of logged real per capita government spending and logged average real per capita consumption across the
income quintiles to a government spending shock. The sample periods are 1980:I-2008:III. “1st Quintile” denotes the lowest
income quintile, and “5th Quintile” denotes the top income quintile. The shaded regions are the 68 percent confidence bands
generated by Monte Carlo simulations.
Autoregressive (VAR) model including the SPF forecast errors, government spending, and
consumption.4 As shown in Figure 3.1, there are substantial differences in the responses of
consumption across income groups to spending shocks: consumption increases for the poor
while it decreases for the rich when government expenditure rises. The peak multipliers for
the first three quintiles are positive while they are negative for the top two quintiles.5 For
example, the peak multiplier for the lowest income quintile is 0.15 whereas that of the highest
is -0.41. In other words, when government increases its spending by one dollar, the poorest
consumers increase their consumption by 15 cents, but consumption for the richest decreases
by 41 cents on average.6 These empirical results are consistent with those in Anderson, Inoue
and Rossi and De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012).
However, the theoretical background for these empirical findings is unclear. As discussed
4See appendix for details on the data and the estimation approach.
5The peak multiplier for a group j is computed as maxhsign
(
∆logCj
t+h
∆logGt
) ∣∣∣∣∆logCjt+h∆logGt
∣∣∣∣ CjG where CjG is the
average ratio of consumption of the group j to government spending.
6These findings are robust when the cumulative multipliers are used as a measure of the effects of
government spending shocks. The cumulative multiplier is defined as the sum of the responses of consumption
divided by the sum of changes in government expenditure.
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by Anderson, Inoue and Rossi (2016), the behavior of the poor and the rich can be respec-
tively explained by different theories. For example, the responses of individuals in the lower
income groups can be supported by traditional Keynesian theory such as IS-LM models,
while the behavior of the rich can be explained by Neoclassical growth theory including
Real Business Cycle (RBC) models.7 Therefore, this study tries to explain why govern-
ment expenditure shocks affect consumers differently using a quantitative analysis based on
a heterogeneous agent economy.
To this aim, I build a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
where there are a large population of heterogeneous households, a government, and many
identical firms. The model economy can be characterized by four main features. First, a
household cannot fully insure against idiosyncratic productivity shocks that it faces: the
asset market is incomplete as in Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). Second, it is assumed
that a labor supply decision for a household is indivisible following Hansen (1985) and Chang
and Kim (2007). Third, and more importantly, the model economy allows for a progressive
taxation scheme following Persson (1983), Benabou (2002), Heathcote, Storesletten and
Violante (2017) and Ferriere and Navarro (2017). Lastly, government spending is productive
as in Barro (1990) and Baxter and King (1993): government spending is in the production
function, so firms’ productivity is positively affected by government activity. With this
assumption, expansionary government spending shocks can increase labor demand, which
is one of the important channels to generate reasonable responses of key aggregate and
disaggregate variables.
The model economy in which government spending is financed by a change in tax progres-
sivity successfully replicates the different responses of consumption between the poor and the
rich to government spending shocks. In the model economy, when the government increases
its spending unexpectedly, there are two main effects on after-tax wage rates, which are key
7In the Neoclassical growth theory such as the RBC model, consumers lower their consumption after a
positive government spending shock mainly due to a negative wealth effect induced by an increase in current
or future taxes. On the other hand, according to the textbook IS-LM theory, households increase their
consumption in response to a positive spending shock since they behave in a non-Ricardian fashion.
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factors in determining households’ consumption and employment.8 One is an increase in tax
progressivity to finance government expenditure, and the other is a rise in labor demand
induced by productive government spending. The former has different impacts on after-tax
wages across individual income levels while the latter is an economy-wide positive effect on
post-tax wages. Specifically, after-tax wage rates rise for consumers in the bottom income
quintiles since an increase in wage rates induced by productive government spending dom-
inates a slight rise in tax rates, while post-tax wage rates fall for the top income groups
since the positive wage effect cannot fully offset a significant increase in income tax rates.
Therefore, consumption for the poor increases since after-tax wage rates increase while the
rich decrease their consumption because of a fall in post-tax income. Indivisibility of the
labor supply decision helps the poor increase their consumption since they are employed in
response to positive government spending shocks, and their labor income increases substan-
tially. I also provide supportive empirical evidence for the key channels of the model. First,
I empirically document that tax progressivity rises in response to positive public spending
shocks. Second, I also find empirical evidence that poor households increase employment
while employment rates for the rich tend to decrease in response to an unexpected rise in
government spending.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The previous studies related to
this work are summarized in Section II. In Section III, I build an incomplete asset market
model that employs a progressive tax system, indivisible labor, and productive government
spending. Sections IV and V summarize the key findings of the model economy. Section VI
concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, this study contributes to the
literature by providing a theoretical background for the observed distributional effects of
8As discussed in Hall (2009), the intratemporal optimality condition is a key to account for the effect of
the government expenditure on consumption.
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government spending shocks. De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012) and Anderson, Inoue and
Rossi (2016) study empirical evidence for the heterogeneous effects of an unexpected govern-
ment spending shock on consumers. Using the CEX data, De Giorgi and Gambetti employ
the common components of the consumption deciles in a VAR with a government spending
shock. Their main result is that consumption increases at the bottom of consumption dis-
tribution while it falls at the top after a government spending shock. Using a VAR with
the SPF forecast errors, Anderson, Inoue and Rossi also find that unexpected increases in
government spending hurt the working-age and the wealthiest individual the most in terms
of consumption. These empirical findings can be replicated by the model economy. Other
related empirical work is Owyang and Zubairy (2013) and Giavazzi and McMahon (2012).9
Second, this study is complementary to a chain of quantitative papers incorporating
heterogeneity across individual households to account for the effects of fiscal policies. Key
contributions are Heathcote (2005), Ferriere and Navarro (2017), and Gali, Lopez-Salido and
Valles (2007). Heathcote (2005) provides one of the first frameworks linking a fiscal policy
with heterogeneous agents. He develops a model economy of incomplete capital markets
to analyze how changes in the timing of linear taxes for income affect an economy in the
short run. The main result of his work is that when capital markets are incomplete, income
tax cuts affect consumption largely compared to the complete market economy. Heathcote
focuses on the impacts of tax shocks on individual consumption whereas this paper considers
the effects of government spending shocks on consumers. The model economy in this study
is probably closest to that of Ferriere and Navarro. They adopt an incomplete market model
which incorporates indivisible labor and progressive taxes to assess the effects of government
spending. From the simulation result of the model, they argue that when government ex-
penditure is financed with a more progressive taxation scheme, a multiplier on aggregate
9Owyang and Zubairy (2013) investigate the effects of federal government spending shocks on state-
level variables and find significant variation in the responses of state-level personal income and employment.
Using household-level data, including the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the CEX, Giavazzi
and McMahon (2012) also study how individuals respond to a change in government expenditure and find
significant heterogeneous responses of hours, consumption, and real wages across households to a spending
shock.
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consumption can be positive. While Ferriere and Navarro mainly focus on the responses
of aggregate variables by asking how government spending can be expansionary, this paper
focuses more on the disaggregate effects of government expenditure on consumption across
income groups. Relative to the government spending analysis of Ferriere and Navarro, I
introduce an explicit role of government spending in the form of productive government
spending, which is also an important feature to account for the reasonable responses of key
macro and micro variables.10 Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007) find that sticky prices
and constrained consumers (also called rule-of-thumb or non-Ricardian consumers) in the
context of calibrated New Keynesian models can reproduce an increase in aggregate con-
sumption in response to a rise in public expenditure.11 While there are only two types of
heterogeneity in the model economy of Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles, the model economy in
this paper generates rich heterogeneity across households’ wealth, income, and consumption.
Compared to the work of Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles, another contribution of this study is
that the model economy can successfully account for the responses of both aggregate and dis-
aggregate consumption to government spending shocks without introducing non-Ricardian
consumers. Other studies analyzing relevance of heterogeneity for fiscal policies are Kaplan
and Violante (2014), Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017), and Chang, Chang and
Kim (2018).
3.3 The Model
I develop a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which employs
a continuum (measure one) of heterogeneous households, a government, and many identical
firms. In the model economy, there are four main assumptions. First, asset markets are
incomplete as in Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) in that households cannot fully insure
10For example, with this assumption, the model economy can generate an increase in the wage rate in
response to positive government spending shocks, while the standard RBC model predicts a decrease in
wages.
11In the model of Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007), constrained households are assumed to behave
in a “hand-to-mouth” manner. In other words, they completely consume their labor income earned in the
current period, and they cannot intertemporally optimize their consumption. Hence, constrained consumers
tend not to smooth their consumption path in the face of fluctuations in taxes.
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against their idiosyncratic productivity shocks. This assumption helps generate substantial
heterogeneity across characteristics of individual households including wealth, income, em-
ployment status, and consumption. Second, following Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988) and
Chang and Kim (2007), it is assumed that a household indivisibly decides hours of work.12
Third, more importantly, the model economy allows for a progressive taxation scheme for the
government following Persson (1983), Benabou (2002), Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante
(2017) and Ferriere and Navarro (2017). Lastly, government expenditure is productive in
the production of firms: the firms’ production is affected by productive government activity
(Barro 1990, Baxter and King 1993, Fisher and Turnovsky 1995, Leeper, Walker and Yang
2010). The different tax burden helps consumers have different after-tax wage rates across
their income, which is a main source of the heterogeneous responses of consumption across
the income distribution. In particular, an interaction between productive public spending
and a discrete labor decision allows poor households to be employed, and hence their con-
sumption increases in response to a rise in government expenditure. Thus, I contribute to
the literature by incorporating productive public expenditure and progressivie taxation into
a heterogeneous agent model economy.
3.3.1 Environment
3.3.1.1 Households
Each household maximizes her expected lifetime utility over consumption ct and hours
of work ht, shown as :
max
{ct,ht}∞t=0
E0
 ∞∑
t=0
βt
ln ct − χ h1+1/φt1 + 1/φ

subject to
12As is well-known, extensive margins for time devoted to work play an important role in accounting for
the variation in total hours worked.
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ct + at+1 = wtxtht + (1 + rt)at − T (wtxtht + rtat),
ct > 0 and at+1 ≥ b,
where 0 < β < 1 denotes the time discount factor, χ > 0 is a parameter for disutility from
working, and φ represents labor supply elasticity. When a household works for ht amount
of hours, she earns wtxtht as wage earnings, where wt is the wage rate for the efficiency unit
of labor, and xt denotes her labor productivity. A household can save or borrow by trading
a claim for assets at, which yields the real rate of return, rt. A household faces a borrowing
constraint that limits the fixed amount of debt: the assets holding cannot go below b at any
time. Each household should pay taxes T , which depend on her total income (the sum of
labor and capital income), wtxtht + rtat.13 Importantly, it is assumed that a labor supply
decision made by a household is indivisible following Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988), and
Chang and Kim (2007): a household supplies a fixed amount of hours (ht = h), or she
does not work at all (ht = 0). Accordingly, there are two employment statuses for each
household: employment and non-employment. The capital markets are incomplete following
Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994): households cannot issue any assets contingent on their
future idiosyncratic risks x, which follows a stochastic process with transition probabilities
Px(x′|x) = Pr(xt+1 = x′|xt = x). In addition, it is assumed that the idiosyncratic risks to
productivity follow an AR(1) process in logs:
ln x′ = ρx ln x+ εx, εx ∼ N(0, σx2).
3.3.1.2 Firms
The production technology for the representative firms is represented by the function
given by:
F (K,L,G) ≡ KαL1−αGγ,
13The form of a taxation scheme in the model will be discussed in detail.
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where K, L and α denote aggregate capital, aggregate effective labor, capital income
share, respectively. Particularly, following Barro (1990), Baxter and King (1993), Fisher
and Turnovsky (1995), and Leeper, Walker and Yang (2010), it is assumed that government
spending, G, can affect a firm’s production characterized by a parameter γ, which represents
the degree of government expenditure externality or output elasticity of public expenditure.
That is, an increase in public expenditure raises a firm’s productivity directly. It is widely
recognized that government spending on roads, public research spending, and medical ser-
vices raises the potential production of an economy.14 G can be interpreted as a stock of
public capital as in Baxter and King and Leeper, Walker and Yang, while in this study it is
considered as a flow of productive public services or public goods for production following
Futagami, Iwaisako and Ohdoi (2008), Kamiguchi and Tamai (2011) and Albertini, Poirier
and Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2014). However, the quantitative results of the two perspectives
are similar.15
The representative firm makes decisions for labor and capital demand to maximize current
profits such that:
Πt = maxKt,Lt
{
Kαt L
1−α
t G
γ
t − wtLt − (rt + δ)Kt
}
,
where δ is the depreciation rate for capital.
3.3.1.3 The Government
The government exogenously spends its expenditure in every period. Specifically, a
government spending shock is assumed to follow a stochastic process with an AR(1) process:
g′ = ρgg + εg, εg ∼ N(0, σg2),
where g denotes log deviation of G from its steady state, i.e., g ≡ lnG− lnGss, and Gss is
the steady state level of government spending.16
14For empirical evidence on the productive government spending, see Bom and Ligthart (2014).
15Regarding this issue, see the working paper of Albertini, Poirier and Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2014).
16It is assumed that government spending shocks and the individual shocks are independent of each other.
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The income tax schedule of an individual household is assumed to follow a log-linear tax
function, which is characterized by two parameters λ and τ :
T (y) ≡

max {(1− λy−τ )y, 0} if y ≥ 0
0 if y < 0
, (3.1)
where y represents individual income, and τ denotes the progressivity of the tax system,
and λ characterizes the average level of taxation.17 max {(1− λy−τ )y, 0} implies no negative
taxes or no public transfers. Suppose that y is positive. Positive (negative) τ means that
the tax system is progressive (regressive): marginal tax rates are larger (lower) than average
rates. Particularly, when τ = 0, the tax system is affine taxation: marginal tax rates are the
same as average rates, and, therefore, T (y) = (1 − λ)y. This type of the taxation function
is widely used in various studies such as Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017) and
Chang, Chang and Kim (2018).
3.3.1.4 Recursive Representation
Consider a recursive equilibrium for the model economy. For each household, the indi-
vidual state variable is the vector θ ≡ (a, x), and the aggregate state is the vector Θ ≡ (µ,G)
where µ is a joint distribution of asset holdings and productivity across households. The
Bellman equation for a employed worker V E(θ, Θ) is defined as:
V E(θ, Θ) = maxc,a′
{
ln c− χh1+1/φ1+1/φ + βE [V (θ′, Θ′)]
}
subject to
c+ a′ = w(Θ)xh+ (1 + r(Θ))a− T (w(Θ)xh+ r(Θ)a), c > 0, a′ ≥ b,
and
17With positive y, 1−τ can be interpreted as a measure for the elasticity of after-tax income to before-tax
income (Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2017).
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µ′ = Ψ(µ,G)
where Ψ denotes a forecasting function for µ.
The value function for a non-employed worker, denoted by V N(θ, Θ), is:
V N(θ, Θ) = maxc,a′ {ln c+ βE [V (θ′, Θ′)]}
subject to
c+ a′ = (1 + r(Θ))a− T (r(Θ)a), c > 0, a′ ≥ b, and µ′ = Ψ(µ,G)
The value function V (θ, Θ) is defined as:
V (θ, Θ) = maxh∈{0,h}
{
V E(θ, Θ), V N(θ, Θ)
}
.
3.3.2 Definition of Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is a transition operator Ψ(Θ), a set of factors {K(Θ), L(Θ)} ,
a set of value functions {V E(θ, Θ),V N(θ, Θ), V (θ, Θ)}, a set of market prices {w(Θ), r(Θ)},
and a set of policy functions {c(θ, Θ),a′(θ, Θ),h(θ, Θ)} such that:
1. Individual optimization: Given market prices, w(Θ) and r(Θ), optimal decision rules
c(θ, Θ), a′(θ, Θ) and h(θ, Θ) solve the Bellman equations.
2. The firm’s profit maximization: K(Θ) and L(Θ) satisfy FL(K,L,G) = w(Θ) and
FK(K,L,G) = r(Θ) + δ for all Θ.
3. Markets clearing: For all Θ,
• Labor market clearing: L(Θ) = ∫ xh(θ, Θ)dµ,
• Capital market clearing: K(Θ) = ∫ adµ, and
• Goods market clearing: K(Θ)αL(Θ)1−αGγ = C(Θ) + I(Θ) + G where C(Θ) =∫
c(θ, Θ)dµ, and I(Θ) = K ′(Θ)− (1− δ)K(Θ).
4. Balanced budget of the government: G =
∫
T (w(Θ)xh(θ, Θ) + r(Θ)a)dµ for all Θ.
5. Consistency of individual and aggregate behaviors.
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Table 3.1: Parameters of the Model Economy
Parameter Value Description
β 0.98703 Time discount factor
h 1/3 Extensive margin for hours worked
φ 0.3 Labor supply elasticity
χ 352.27 Parameter for disutility from working
ρx 0.939 Persistence of productivity shocks
σx 0.287 Standard deviation of productivity shocks
b -2.0 Borrowing constraint
α 0.33 Capital income share
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
γ 0.15 Output elasticity of public expenditure
ρg 0.92 Persistence of government spending shocks
σg 0.012 Standard deviation of government spending shocks
Gss/Yss 0.2 Steady state ratio of G to Y
λ 0.740 Parameter for average tax rate in steady state
τ 0.20 Progressivity of taxes in steady state
ω 0.85 Tax policy parameter
3.3.3 Calibration
In this subsection, I discuss calibration for the parameters used in the model economy.
A simulation period is a quarter in the model. Table 4.1 summarizes the parameter values
used in the model economy.
3.3.3.1 Preference and Borrowing Constraint
The parameter φ, which represents the micro elasticity of labor supply, is set to 0.3. This
value is based on the findings that conventional micro estimates of the elasticity of labor
supply are small (0 − 0.5).18 Fixed amount of hours worked, h, is chosen to be 1/3. The
time discount factor, β, and the disutility parameter of working, χ, are set so that quarterly
return to capital is one percent, and the employment rate is 70 percent. The U.S. data such
as the PSID and Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) consistently report that employment
18It is noted that the choice of φ does not affect the simulated results due to indivisibility of a labor
supply decision for households.
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rates are around 70 percent.19 The borrowing constraint, b, is -2.0, which is approximately
double the quarterly average income in the model economy.20
3.3.3.2 Production Technology
The capital income share, α, and the quarterly depreciation rate, δ, are calibrated to be
0.33 and 2.5 percent, respectively. The output elasticity of public capital, γ, differs substan-
tially across studies. Bom and Ligthart (2014) estimate the average of the output elasticity
of public expenditure over 578 different estimates from 68 studies for various countries. I
compute the simple average of estimates for the U.S. from Table A1 of Bom and Ligthart
and find that it is 0.148.21 Thus, I set γ = 0.15.
3.3.3.3 Labor Productivity
For individual labor productivity shocks, previous studies in the literature including
Floden and Linde (2001), French (2005), Chang and Kim (2006), and Chang, Kim and
Schorfheide (2013) consistently report that the shocks are persistent and variance of them is
also large. Following Chang, Kim and Schorfheide, I set ρx = 0.939 and σx = 0.287, which
are estimated with the AR(1) wage process from the PSID.22
3.3.3.4 Government
Regarding the government spending shocks, I choose ρg = 0.92 and σg = 0.015 from the
estimates of Zubairy (2014). The steady-state ratio of the government spending to GDP is
set to be 0.2 (Gss/Yss = 0.2). The steady-state level of tax progressivity, τ , is calibrated
to be 0.2, which is the average of progressivity using two different measures for the sample
19Self-employed workers are included for the calculation of employment rates as they are also included in
the CEX data.
20With this value, the fraction of households who own zero or negative wealth is around 20 percent, which
is consistent with that in the U.S. data such as the PSID 1994.
21Bom and Ligthart (2014) find that the simple average estimate for the whole sample is 0.188.
22Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2013) use the maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of Heckman (1979)
when they estimate the AR(1) process of wage rates in logs to solve the self-selection problem for wage
workers.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of Wealth and Income
Quintile Gini1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Panel A: Wealth Distribution
Data
SCF 1992 -0.39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 0.78
PSID 1994 -1.22 0.88 4.98 14.68 80.68 0.79
Model Economy -3.13 3.49 12.72 26.86 60.06 0.62
Panel B: Income Distribution
Data
SCF 1992 2.18 6.63 11.80 19.47 59.91 0.57
PSID 1994 -0.27 5.06 13.94 24.80 56.48 0.57
Model Economy 1.59 6.13 13.15 24.08 55.05 0.53
Note: Distributions of wealth (Panel A) and income (Panel B) for U.S. data and the model economy. Statistics for the SCF
1992 are from Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997).
periods between 1980 and 2008.23 In the steady state, the parameter λ is chosen so that the
government runs a balanced budget.
3.4 Cross-sectional Distributions
As I investigate the distributional effects of the government spending shocks on consump-
tion across the income quintiles, I first analyze if the model economy generates reasonable
heterogeneity across individual households. Particularly, it is important to reasonably repli-
cate consumption distribution or average consumption across the income quintiles as a means
to an end for this study.
Table 3.2 summarizes the detailed information on income and asset holdings from the
U.S data (the SCF 1992 and the PSID 1994) and the model.24 Overall, the wealth is less
23Based on the same tax schedule function of this study, Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017) find
the similar value of the progressivity parameter.
24I use the PSID 1994 survey because this survey year has information on both wealth and income, and
it falls in the midpoint of the sample period of the CEX in this study. For a robustness check, I use the
SCF 1992, which is from Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997). Income is defined as all kinds of
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Table 3.3: Characteristics of Income Distribution (ranked by income)
Quintile All1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Panel A: Data
Share of income -0.27 5.06 13.94 24.80 56.48 100
Share of after-tax/transfer income 4.87 9.18 14.92 24.06 46.94 100
Employment rate 17.51 67.90 85.82 93.76 96.25 72.2
Share of consumption 11.02 15.08 18.07 22.53 33.30 100
Average consumption (×$103) 1.21 1.66 1.99 2.48 3.66 2.22
MPC 0.58 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.48
Panel B: Model Economy
Share of income 1.59 6.13 13.15 24.08 55.05 100
Share of after-tax/transfer income 2.21 8.27 15.65 25.36 48.51 100
Employment rate 10.79 50.92 88.76 99.82 99.99 70.0
Share of consumption 13.91 17.38 18.20 21.59 28.93 100
Average consumption (×$103) 1.54 1.93 2.02 2.40 3.22 2.22
MPC 0.86 0.63 0.60 0.80 0.56 0.69
Note: Characteristics of income distribution. Statistics for income and employment rates are from the PSID 1994. Statistics
for after-tax/transfer income are from the PSID 1991. Statistics for consumption are computed from the CEX 1980:I-2008:III.
The average quarterly per capita consumption for the data and the model is in thousands of U.S. dollars for year 2000. The
values of MPC in the data are from Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014). The quarterly MPCs in the model are transformed into
annual ones using the formula 1− (1−quarterly MPC)4.
concentrated in the model economy. The wealth Gini indexes for the SCF 1992 and the
PSID 1994 are 0.78 and 0.79, respectively, while it is 0.62 in the model economy. However,
the primary objective in this paper is not to account for the highly concentrated wealth
distribution.25
The model economy successfully reproduces the income distribution, which is a baseline
dimension of inequality in this paper to study the distributional effects on the government
spending shocks on consumption across the income quintiles. In both data and model econ-
omy, households in the first quintile earn less than three percent of total income, and the
revenue for family or households before taxes and transfers, and wealth is defined as the net worth of family
or households.
25For studies on highly concentrated wealth distribution in the context of the heterogeneous agent model
frameworks, see Quadrini (2000), Castaneda, Diaz-Giminez and Rios-Rull (2003) and Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006).
42
income share for the fifth quintile is around 60 percent.26 The Gini coefficient for income in
the model is 0.53, which is close to the data (0.57). In order to take a close look at character-
istics of the income distribution, I compute various dimensions of inequality, including the
consumption shares and average consumption (per capita) across the income quintiles for
the data and the model economy in Table 3.3.27 The model economy reasonably replicates
the observed after-tax/transfer income distribution: the share of after-tax/transfer income
for the poorest increases compared to that of before-tax/transfer income while it decreases
for the richest. Also, as shown in the U.S data, the increasing pattern of labor supply (the
employment rates) across the income quintiles is well-reproduced in the model economy.28
Next, the consumption shares across the income distribution are successfully reproduced:
households in the lowest income quintile consume 11.02 percent and 13.91 percent of total
consumption in the data and the model, respectively, while households in the top quintile
consume 33.3 percent and 28.93 percent of total consumption in the data and the model,
respectively. Importantly, average consumption (per capita) across the income quintiles in
the model economy fits the U.S. data well.29 The first and the fifth quintiles of the in-
come distribution in the model economy consume $1,540 (in U.S. dollars for year 2000) and
$3,220 over a quarter, respectively, which are comparable to the data ($1,210 and $3,660,
respectively).
Next, I compare the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) produced in the model to
the empirical values in the literature. The average MPC in the model is 0.69, which is
26Since income is defined as before-tax/transfer income, it can be negative. The negative income for the
income-poorest may come from their business or capital losses (Diaz-Gimnnez, Glover and Rios-Rull, 2011).
Using the SCF, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) and Diaz-Gimnnez, Glover and Rios-Rull
(2011) also find that the income-poorest have negative income. Note that the share of after-tax/transfer
income for the poorest is positive.
27Statistics for income and employment rates are from the PSID 1994, and information on consumption is
computed from the CEX averages. Statistics for after-tax/transfer income are from the PSID 1991 because
the PSID has not provided estimates of federal income tax payments for each tax unit since 1992.
28The model generates the increasing pattern of labor supply by income quintiles thanks to a progressive
tax function, but this is typically hard to obtain in a standard incomplete market model.
29For comparison between the data and the model economy, I adjust the units of consumption in a way
that average consumption of the model economy matches mean consumption in the CEX. Average quarterly
consumption for data and the model is in U.S. dollars for year 2000.
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much larger than the 0.33 reported in Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod (2010) or the 0.48 in
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014).30 The model economy generates the higher MPC since both
individual and aggregate shocks are highly persistent, while most of the estimates of MPC
in the existing empirical papers are based on the tax rebate policies in 2001 and 2008 (e.g.,
Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2006) and Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod (2010) among others),
which are temporary changes in income.31 The MPCs across income quintiles for the data
and the model are reported in the last row of Panel A and B in Table 3.3, respectively. As
reported in Jappelli and Pistaferri, there is a wide range of heterogeneity in the MPC across
households, and it declines with income.32 The model economy also broadly replicates the
decreasing pattern of the MPCs across income groups even if the MPC in the fourth quintile
jumps.33 Following Chang and Park (2017), I also focus on the MPCs across income groups
relative to the average since a direct comparison between the levels of MPC for the model
and the empirical estimates may not be fair. The relative MPCs for the first and fifth income
quintile in the model are 1.25 and 0.82, respectively, while the corresponding empirical values
in the data are 1.22 and 0.83, respectively. Thus, the model generates MPCs that are quite
similar to those in the data in a relative sense.
From the results in this section, I argue that the model economy generates reasonable het-
erogeneity to study the distributional effects of the government expenditure on consumption
over income levels.
30The model-implied MPC is obtained using a simple regression: I regress consumption on after-tax
income with constant term based on 1,000 periods of quarterly time series for each income group. I transform
the quarterly into an annual MPC using the formula 1− (1−quarterly MPC)4.
31Similarly, a Huggett-style incomplete market model by Chang and Park (2017) also generates the higher
average MPC of 0.85.
32Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) use the 2010 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth when
estimating the MPCs.
33Using a life-cycle model with liquid and illiquid assets, Kaplan and Violante (2014) show a striking
difference of MPCs out of the fiscal stimulus payment for those who are hand-to-mouth and those who are
not. A recent paper by Chang and Park (2017) reports the comparison of MPC’s between the quantitative
model and the data.
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3.5 Distributional Effects of Government Spending
3.5.1 Taxation scheme
In this section, I investigate the effects on the government spending shocks, focusing on
the responses of consumption across the income quintiles. For the taxation scheme, I assume
that government expenditure is partially financed by adjusting progressivity. Specifically,
given the tax function previously discussed, a path of τ and λ will be adjusted so that
the government keeps a balanced budget when government spending unexpectedly increases.
Since there are infinitely many combinations of the two parameters which satisfy the balanced
government budget, I assume that the government employs a simple linear rule for the
combination of the two parameters such that:
(1− ω)τ˜ + ωλ˜ = 0, (3.2)
where z˜ denotes an absolute deviation of a variable, z, from its steady state. Notice that
the parameter ω captures weight on the policy only financed by progressivity changes. For
example, ω = 1 means that government spending is only financed by changing τ with fixed
λ.
The next question is how government spending affects tax progressivity. To see this, I
compute a measure for tax progressivity using the log-linear function for the tax system in
Equation 3.1. Suppose that y > 0. Following Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017)
and Ferriere and Navarro (2017), tax progressivity, τ , can be computed such that:
τ = T
′(y)− T (y)/y
1− T (y)/y . (3.3)
According to Equation 3.3, measures for the average tax rate (T (y)/y) and the average
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Figure 3.2: Historical Trends of Tax Progressivity
Note: Historical trends of tax progressivity with two different measures. Measures for tax progressivity is computed using
Equation 3.3. Given the average marginal tax rates which are from Barro and Redlick (2011) and Mertens and Montiel Olea
(2018), τ RZ is measured using information on nominal tax and nominal GDP from Ramey and Zubairy (2018) while τ IRS is
computed using information on taxes and total income from IRS. News variables are defined as the fraction of nominal GDP
of the previous year (%). War periods are WWI (1914), WWII (1939), the Korean War (1950), Vietnam War (1965), Soviet
Invasion to Afghanistan (1980), and 9/11 (2001).
marginal tax rate (T ′(y)) across income levels are needed to obtain a measure for progres-
sivity, τ . I use information on the share of nominal tax over nominal GDP from Ramey
and Zubairy (2018) as a measure for the average tax rates. As a robustness check, I use
the time series for total taxes (total tax liability) and income from Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). For the average marginal tax rate (T ′(y)), the historical data computed by Barro and
Redlick (2011) and Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018) are used.34 In particular, as far as the
measures for government spending shocks are concerned, I use the defense news series built
by Ramey and Zubairy. News variables are defined as the fraction of nominal GDP of the
previous year. Figure 3.2 reports the historical trends of measures for U.S tax progressivity,
news shocks, and the years the wars started over the period of 1913-2011.35 An interesting
34Data for the periods of 1913-1945 are from Barro and Redlick (2011), and time series for 1946-2011 are
from Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018).
35War periods are WWI (1914), WWII (1939), Korean War (1950), Vietnam War (1965), Soviet Invasion
to Afghanistan (1980), and 9/11 (2001).
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Figure 3.3: Responses of Tax Progressivity to News Shocks
Note: Responses of real per capita government spending and tax progressivitiy (τ RZ) to news shocks for the sample period
1950-2008. The government spending and tax progressivitiy are logged. The shaded regions are the 68 percent confidence bands
generated by Monte Carlo simulations. The horizontal axis reports the number of years after the shock.
fact emerges from Figure 3.2: progressivity of taxes tends to rise with positive news shocks.
For example, tax progressivity skyrocketed during war time such as WWI (1914), WWII
(1939), the Korean War (1950) and, more recently, 9/11 (2001).
In order to quantitatively investigate whether and how much progressivity increases with
an unexpected rise in government spending, I estimate response functions of progressivity
to defense news shocks based on the VAR where the defense news shocks are ordered first,
and constant terms, quadratic trend terms, and a one-period lag are included. I use an
annual sample for the post-WWII periods but excluding the ZLB periods and onward to be
consistent with the CEX sample (1980:I-2008:III). As shown in Figure 3.3, tax progressivity
rises in response to positive public spending shocks. These results are in support of evidence
that a rise in government spending is accompanied by an increase in tax progressivity. Table
3.4 reports progressivity elasticities of government spending across different samples and
estimation approaches. According to Table 3.4, the progressivity elasticity of government
spending is around 4 - 6. Hence, I choose ω = 0.85 so that the elasticity is around five.36
This finding is in line with work of Vélez (2014) and Ferriere and Navarro (2017). Vélez
shows that progressive income taxation in the twentieth century is a byproduct of war using
36Ferriere and Navarro (2017) use a much larger value for the progressivity elasticity of government
spending: they assume that the elasticity is 10 on impact for the “Higher Progressivity” case.
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Table 3.4: Progressivity Elasticity of Government Spending
Peak Two-year Integral Four-year Integral
5.26 3.73 5.80
Note: Progressivity elasticity of government spending for the sample period 1950-2008.
a long time series of the top marginal personal income tax rate of multiple countries. Ferriere
and Navarro also find that the effect of government spending on macro variables is much
larger when it is financed with more progressive taxes. Similarly, Barro and Redlick (2011)
and Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018) report that significant increases in the federal average
marginal income-tax rate are related to wartime.
3.5.2 Results
3.5.2.1 Responses of Aggregate Variables
The responses of key aggregate variables in the model economy to government spending
shocks for 20 quarters of horizon are shown in Figure 4.2. In response to a positive govern-
ment spending shock, output increases significantly. The impact or peak output multiplier
for government expenditure in the model economy is around one, which is comparable to
empirical findings of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001), and Zubairy
(2010). Particularly, the model economy generates the fact that consumption and the wage
rate respond positively to government spending shocks, while the standard RBC model
predicts a reduction in wages and consumption.37 The peak consumption multiplier for gov-
ernment expenditure in the model economy is around 0.03.38 Investment is crowded out by
public spending shocks, which is also found in empirical work such as Blanchard and Perotti,
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and Zubairy. Lastly, hours (employment) and interest rates
also rise significantly as in empirical analyses in the literature.
37A rise in consumption and wages in response to a positive government spending shock is supported
by most of the empirical studies in the literature, such as Fatas and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007), Zubairy (2010), and Ramey (2011).
38See Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
and Ramey (2011) for the estimates of consumption multipliers of government spending.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse-responses of Aggregate Variables: Model Economy
Note: Responses of aggregate variables to a government spending shock. All variables other than interest rates are logged.
3.5.2.2 Distributional Effect on Consumption
The main focus of this study is on the distributional effects of government spending
shocks on consumption across the income distribution. Figure 3.5 exhibits the responses
of consumption across the income quintiles to a positive government spending shock. The
model economy successfully matches the responses of consumption between the poor and the
rich with the empirical findings discussed earlier. According to Figure 3.5, consumption of
households in the first three income quintiles increases while that of richer households (the top
two quintiles) decreases. Table 3.5, which reports consumption multipliers for government
expenditure across income groups, confirms these findings. The peak multipliers are positive
for the poor income groups and negative for the rich. For example, the peak multiplier of
the first income quintile is 0.28 while that of the fifth quintile is -0.69. The signs of one-year
and two-year integral multipliers are also well replicated.
The intuitive explanation for the results is as follows. Under the assumption of the divis-
ible labor decision, as discussed in Hall (2009), it is the intratemporal optimality condition –
jointly determining optimal hours and consumption – that has a key mechanism accounting
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Figure 3.5: Responses of Consumption across Income Quintiles
Note: Responses of average per capita consumption across the income quintiles to a government spending shock. All variables
are logged. “1st Quintile” denotes the lowest income quintile, and “5th Quintile” denotes the top income quintile.
Table 3.5: Multipliers across Income Quintiles: Model Economy
Variable Peak IRF 1 Year Integral 2 Year Integral
1st Quintile 0.28 0.27 0.27
2nd Quintile 0.31 0.24 0.32
3rd Quintile 0.52 0.54 0.54
4th Quintile -0.18 -0.12 -0.08
5th Quintile -0.69 -0.76 -0.84
Note: Consumption multipliers across the income quintiles in the model economy. “1st Quintile” denotes the lowest income
quintile, and “5th Quintile” denotes the top income quintile.
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for the effect of government expenditure on consumption. Hence, after-tax wage rates are
crucial to determine the response of consumption to a spending shock. If government spend-
ing is financed by changing progressivity, a substantial degree of heterogeneity of post-tax
wage rates across the income distribution arises. Therefore, the tax system associated with
the spending policy plays a crucial role in the different responses of consumption between
the poor and the rich. When the government increases its spending unexpectedly, there are
two main effects on after-tax wage rates in the model economy: a rise in tax progressivity
to finance the rise in spending and an increase in labor demand due to productive public
expenditure. The former differently affects post-tax wages across income levels while the
latter is an economy-wide effect on after-tax wage rates. Specifically, with positive income,
the after-tax wage rate, wat, is given by
wat ≡ λ{wxh+ ra}−τw. (3.4)
Suppose that λ is fixed for simplicity. Then, for given prices, r and w, a rise in τ
after a spending shock allows changes in wat to be different across income levels: wat tends
to increase for the poor but decrease for the rich. Next, productive government spending
increases labor demand and in turn raises wage rates, w.39 An interaction between productive
government spending and a tax progressivity change generates heterogeneous responses of
the after-wage rates across households. wat increases significantly for consumers in the lower
income quintiles since an increase in wage rates induced by productive government spending
dominates a slight rise in tax rates. In contrast, wat falls for those who are in the top
quintiles because the effect of productive government spending is dominated by the effect of
tax progressivity. Panel B in Figure 3.6, which depicts responses of wat across the income
quintiles to a positive government spending shock, supports this mechanism: the first four
income groups show the positive responsiveness of wat while it significantly decreases for the
39Of course, an increase in the prices results in a reduction in wat, but this effect may not be large with
small positive τ.
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Table 3.6: Marginal Worker Distribution (ranked by income)
Quintile All1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
ξ = 0.03 11.96 7.45 6.77 3.53 0.53 6.05
ξ = 0.05 18.49 12.54 10.67 5.44 0.82 9.59
ξ = 0.07 24.34 17.72 14.73 7.56 1.15 13.10
Note: Shares of marginal workers across the income quintiles. Marginal workers are defined as Equation 3.5. “1st Quintile”
denotes the lowest income quintile, and “5th Quintile” denotes the top income quintile.
top income quintile.
When a labor supply decision is indivisible, post-tax wage rates are much more important
for the consumption dynamics since labor supply elasticity for the poor becomes even larger
with the indivisibility of labor supply. Table 3.6, which shows shares of marginal workers
across the income quintiles, provides evidence for it. A marginal worker is defined as a
worker who is almost indifferent between working and not-working at the steady state.
Formally, given assets holding, a, and productivity, x, a household is a marginal worker
when m(a, x) = 1, and m(a, x) is given by:
m(a, x) ≡

1 if
∣∣∣V E(a, x)− V N(a, x)∣∣∣ < ξ
0 otherwise
, (3.5)
where ξ is a small real number. According to Table 3.6, marginal workers are relatively
many at the bottom of the income distribution. For example, when ξ = 0.05, around 20
percent of households are marginal workers in the first income quintile, while the share of
marginal workers is less than one percent in the top quintile.40 In other words, labor supply
elasticity of lower-income consumers is much larger than that of rich households. Accordingly,
40I choose ξ = 0.05 as a benchmark number since the share of workers who change their employment
status is 9.6 percent in the steady state.
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non-employed households (before a spending shock) in the lower income groups, who are
likely to be marginal workers as shown in Table 3.6, become employed after the shock since
wat is greater than the reservation wage rates. Figure 3.6 confirms this story line: households
in the first three lowest income quintiles increase hours of work or decide to be employed
due to a significant rise in wat.41 In turn, this allows the poor to increase after-tax income
and consumption as found in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.5. However, as shown in Figure 3.6,
hours worked for consumers in the upper quintiles (the fourth and the fifth income groups)
drop, and their post-tax income remains almost constant or falls since wat increases a bit
or decreases.42 Finally, the rich reduce their consumption (Figure 3.5). If λ is allowed to
change following the tax policy rule in Equation 3.2, the main results are still the same.43
Interestingly, the behavior of consumers in the fourth income group is different from the
others. For the poor (the first three quintiles), the direction of hours is consistent with that
of wat, which implies that the substitution effect is larger than the income effect. The top
income quintile does not change their hours of work since wat for a majority of the richest is
still greater than the reservation wage rates, or the share of marginal workers is very small.
However, households in the fourth income group decrease their consumption and hours with
a small rise in wat, which suggests that the income effect dominates the substitution effect.
I also provide supportive empirical evidence for the different responses of employment
across income groups to government spending shocks, which is the key channel of the model.
For this analysis, I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) since the CPS has better
information on labor force participation than the CEX. Since information on income in the
CPS is available in March of every year, I cannot use quarterly data for employment rates
across income quintiles. Hence, I use annual data spanning 1980 to 201444 and use the SPF
41Of course, employed workers at the bottom quintiles of the income distribution also can increase their
consumption due to an increase in after-tax income induced by a rise in wat for them.
42Not surprisingly, there might be households in the richest quintile who lose their jobs but this effect
may not be large since most of them are not marginal workers as in Table 3.6.
43Compared to fixed λ, wat for the poor (for the rich) may increase (decrease) less since τ increases less.
44Due to the small sample size, I do not exclude the ZLB period for this analysis.
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Figure 3.6: Responses of Hours, After-tax Wage Rates, and After-tax Income across Income
Quintiles
Note: Responses of average hours , average after-tax wage rates, average after-tax income across the income quintiles to a
government spending shock. All variables are logged. “1st Quintile” denotes the lowest income quintile, and “5th Quintile”
denotes the top income quintile.
forecast errors as the measure of government spending shocks.45 To estimate the effects
of a government spending shock on employment by income, I employ the VAR where the
SPF forecast errors are ordered first, and constant terms, quadratic trend terms, and a
one-period lag are included. Figure 3.7 reports the estimated response of employment rates
across income groups. As predicted by the model economy, households in the lower income
quintiles increase employment while employment rates for richer households tend to decrease
in response to positive government spending shocks. This supports the model prediction of
heterogeneous effects of government spending on employment between the poor and the rich.
3.5.2.3 Role of Indivisible Labor
Indivisibility of labor choice allows for producing heterogeneous Frisch elasticity of the
labor supply across income levels since individuals have different reservation wages: labor
supply elasticity in the bottom of the income distribution is very large while that of rich
households is almost zero.46 In contrast, the Frisch elasticity is the same between the poor
and the rich under the assumption of a flexible hours decision. A discrete choice for labor
45In this case, the measure of SPF forecast errors is defined as the difference between the actual federal
spending growth from a year ago in March and the four-quarter-ahead SPF forecast of government spending
in March.
46The Frisch labor supply elasticity is defined as the percentage change in hours caused by one percentage
change in wages, abstracting from the effect on wealth.
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Figure 3.7: Responses of Employment Rate across Income Quintiles
Note: Responses of employment rates across the income quintiles to a government spending shock based on the CPS 1980-2014.
“1st Quintile” denotes the lowest income quintile, and “5th Quintile” denotes the top income quintile.
supply plays two important roles in the model economy. First, the assumption allows the
government to increase progressivity to finance a rise in government spending since labor
supply elasticity of higher-income households is very small under the assumption of indivisible
labor. Second, households in the lower income groups can significantly increase hours worked
with indivisibility of a labor choice, which allows the poor to increase consumption. However,
the above two facts are incompatible in a model with divisible labor. On the one hand,
if elasticity of the labor supply is too high in the divisible labor model, the government
should decrease progressivity to increase tax revenue, which is inconsistent with the empirical
evidence. On the other hand, when the labor supply is very inelastic, the poor cannot increase
their consumption due to a small rise in hours. The latter case is reported in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8 compares the responses of key aggregate variables (Panel A) and consumption
across the income quintiles (Panel B) to a government spending shock in the indivisible
and divisible labor models. For the divisible labor model economy (DL model), I set the
same value of Frisch labor elasticity (0.3) as in the indivisible labor model (IL model).47 As
47For other parameter values in the DL model, the same calibration strategies used in the IL model are
applied.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse-responses with Indivisible and Divisible Labor
Note: Responses of aggregate variables (Panel A) and consumption across the income quintiles (Panel B). “IL” and “DL” denote
indivisible and divisible labor, respectively. All variables other than interest rates are logged. “1st Quintile” denotes the lowest
income quintile, and “5th Quintile” denotes the top income quintile.
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found in Figure 3.8, the DL model fails to replicate the responses of both macro and micro
variables even if progressivity increases as much as in the IL model. The small elasticity of
the labor supply for poor households results in a decrease in consumption for most of them.
In contrast, since the labor supply elasticity for the rich in the DL model is relatively large
compared to that in the IL model, they reduce their hours as a consequence of a decrease
in after-tax wage rates, which leads to a drop in aggregate hours. The relatively large labor
supply elasticity for higher income households also results in a substantial decrease in income
and causes their investment and consumption to drop significantly. Consequently, aggregate
consumption and investment fall, and a reduction in hours finally decreases output in the
DL model.
3.5.2.4 Role of Productive Government Spending and Taxation Scheme
The interaction between productive government expenditure and the more progressive
taxation scheme in response to an unexpected rise in government spending generates the
heterogeneous effects of government spending on consumption by income as well as the
reasonable responses of the key aggregate variables. In order to investigate the marginal
contributions of each, I consider three additional model economies: an economy with pro-
ductive government spending only (γ = 0.15, τ = 0), an economy with progressive taxation
only (γ = 0, τ = 0.2), and an economy with neither of them (γ = 0, τ = 0). Except for γ and
τ , calibration strategies for the three models are the same as those used for the benchmark
model economy.
Figure 3.9 shows the responses of the key macro variables (Panel A) and consumption
across income groups (Panel B). Productive government spending alone does not generate
the observed aggregate effects of government spending shocks. When τ = 0, the tax system
is linear. This implies that changes in tax rates in response to government spending shocks
are the same for all the households. In the model with productive government spending only,
a rise in after-tax wage rates due to productive government spending is dominated by the
rise in tax rates. Accordingly, both aggregate hours and consumption decrease after positive
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Figure 3.9: Impulse-responses for the Four Models
Note: Responses of aggregate variables (Panel A) and consumption across the income quintiles (Panel B). All variables other
than interest rates are logged. “1st Quintile” denotes the lowest income quintile, and “5th Quintile” denotes the top income
quintile. “Productive G Only” denotes an economy with productive government spending only, and “Progressive Tax Only”
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government spending shocks. Productive government spending only also fails to explain the
heterogeneous responses of consumption across income groups since there are no different
effects on after-tax wage rates across households under the affine taxation: as found in Panel
B of Figure 3.9, households in all the income quintiles other than the third quintile reduce
their consumption.48
Next, the model economy with progressive taxation only shows that the progressive tax
system alone cannot account for the responses of the key macroeconomic variables even
though it replicates the distributional effects on consumption between the poor and the
rich.49 On aggregate, output and wages decrease in this model in response to an unexpected
rise in public spending, which is not comparable to the empirical findings in the literature. In
this case, firms do not increase labor demand since the model excludes productive government
spending. Hence, hours increase by less compared to the benchmark model, and wage rates
decrease. In the model economy with progressive taxation only, there are more heterogeneous
effects on after-tax wages since an economy-wide effect on after-tax wage rates induced
by productive government spending is omitted.50 Thus, rich households tend to reduce
investment and consumption considerably while households in the bottom of the income
distribution can increase their consumption. Finally, aggregate investment and consumption
fall significantly mainly due to a substantial decrease in after-tax income from the rich, and
it in turn leads to a reduction in output.
By the same logic, the model economy with neither productive government spending nor
a progressive tax system fails to account for the responses of both aggregate and disaggregate
48Compositional changes may cause consumption in the third income quintile to increase.
49The reason why consumption in the second quintile shows a negative sign in the “Progressive Tax
Only” model is as follows. In the model economy, households in the second income group own relatively
large amounts of wealth due to the assumption of indivisible labor. Hence, the response of post-tax interest
rates to government spending shocks relatively matters for them. With productive government spending, the
second quintile can increase their consumption and investment at the same time since after-tax interest rates
rise significantly. However, without productive government spending or in the model of the “Progressive
Tax Only”, an increase in after-tax interest rates is relatively small. Therefore, they want to save more and
consume less since the intertemporal substitution effect is larger than the income effect.
50In the model economy with progressive taxation only, ω is chosen to be 0.97 which is larger than the
0.85 in the benchmark model. Hence, the larger ω causes the model economy to have more heterogeneous
effects on post-tax wage rates across households.
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variables to a spending shock. From this analysis, I can conclude that the interaction between
productive government spending and a progressive taxation scheme plays a crucial role in
explaining the distributional effects of government spending on consumption by income as
well as the responses of the key aggregate variables.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper tries to uncover why consumers behave differently in response to a govern-
ment spending shock. To this end, I construct a heterogeneous agent model economy which
incorporates a progressive taxation scheme, productive government expenditure, and indi-
visible labor. I find that the model economy successfully replicates the different responses of
consumption between the bottom and the top of income distribution to government spend-
ing shocks. When the government increases its spending accompanied with a rise in tax
progressivity, poor households are employed and hence increase their consumption due to
an increase in after-tax wage rates while the rich decrease consumption since the effect of
productive government spending cannot fully offset a significant increase in tax rates.
Existing theoretical macroeconomic models inspired by Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles
(2007) suggest that credit-constrained consumers are crucial to account for why government
spending shocks have substantially different effects on consumers. On the other hand, this
study proposes a new perspective by suggesting that it is important to consider different tax
burdens across consumers when studying the distributional effects of government spending
shocks.
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4. MONETARY POLICY AND INEQUALITY: HOW DOES ONE AFFECT THE
OTHER?
4.1 Introduction
The unequal distributions of income and wealth have become a primary concern for
economists and policy makers (Piketty, 2014; White House, 2017). In recent years, such
inequality is particularly relevant for the stabilization role of economic policies since policies
might have disparate effects across different segments of the population. This study investi-
gates the relation between monetary policy and inequality. On the one hand, discretionary
changes in monetary policy actions can have distributional effects on consumption, income,
and wealth in the short run.1 On the other hand, the level of inequality may affect the
effectiveness of monetary policy in the long run.2 Specifically, this paper studies both the
effects of monetary policy on inequality and the role of the long-run level of inequality in the
effectiveness of monetary policy, by answering the following questions:
1. How does discretionary monetary policy affect income, consumption and wealth in-
equality, and what is the key mechanism?
2. How does the long-run level of inequality affect the effectiveness of monetary policy in
terms of output, and what is the linkage?
In regards to the first question, an increasing concern about economic inequality has resulted
in monetary policymakers discussing the potential distributional effects of monetary policy
instruments (Mersch, 2014; Bullard, 2014; Bernanke, 2015). However, how monetary policy
actions affect inequality is still ambiguous since there are a number of underlying channels
as pointed out by Mersch (2014) and Bernanke (2015).3 In this paper, I propose a new
1In this paper, I do not focus on the effect of systematic parts of monetary policy.
2The “effectiveness of monetary policy” is defined as the extent to which monetary policy affects output,
i.e., the responsiveness of output.
3Coibion et al. (2017) discuss the possible channels of the distributional effects of monetary policy:
portfolio channel (households hold different financial assets), the savings redistribution channel (savers and
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transmission mechanism of the distributional effects of monetary policy by developing a
heterogeneous agent model economy with nominal wage contracts and indivisible labor.4 In
this model economy, nominal wage contracts are important for explaining the disaggregate
effects of monetary policy shocks. As far as the second question is concerned, how the
long-run level of economic inequality affects the effectiveness of monetary policy is also an
important issue, when considering different degrees of inequality across countries and even
within a country. In spite of its importance, this topic is relatively unstudied in the literature,
and existing papers (e.g., Kim (2017) and Cravino, Lan and Levchenko (2018)) do not have
a general consensus.5 Filling this gap is another primary goal of this study.
To study the relation between monetary policy and inequality, I build a dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where there is a large population of heterogeneous
households, a government, and many identical firms. In the model economy, it is assumed
that asset markets are incomplete as in Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) in that house-
holds cannot fully insure against their idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Cash-in-advance
constraints are considered in the standard real business cycle model as in Cooley and Hansen
(1989).6 Importantly, nominal wage contracts are also introduced in the model economy as in
Cho and Cooley (1995) and Janko (2008). Nominal wage contracts play an important role in
borrowers are differentially affected by monetary policy), the financial segmentation channel (households
have different access to financial markets and instruments). Auclert (2017) focuses on the three channels: an
earnings heterogeneity channel from unequal income gains, Fisher channel from unexpected inflation, and
interest rate exposure channel from real interest rate changes.
4Some recent studies in the literature provide channels of redistributive effects of monetary policy in the
context of New Keynesian frameworks. For example, Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018) focus on the role of
the different marginal propensities to consume (MPC) across households by incorporating both liquid and
illiquid assets, and Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (2016) build an incomplete asset market model where
matching frictions create countercyclical labor-market risks.
5Kim (2017) finds that an economy when there are more low-income consumers has a smaller impact of
monetary policy on real output, but Cravino, Lan and Levchenko (2018) conclude that a change in the level
of inequality does not significantly impact the responses of aggregate prices and output to monetary policy.
The main result in the paper contradicts that in Kim (2017) or Cravino, Lan and Levchenko (2018): a more
equal economy is associated with more effective monetary policy in terms of output. The finding in this
study is supported by empirical papers in the literature such as Alpanda and Zubairy (2017) and Voinea,
Lovin and Cojocaru (2018).
6In this class of the model, (i) money is directly transferred from a government (or a money authority)
to households, (ii) money growth (money supply) shocks are introduced as an instrument of the monetary
policy, and (iii) households should hold cash to buy goods and services.
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a monetary transmission mechanism for both aggregate and disaggregate effects. Due to the
nominal wage contracts, real wages will reasonably respond to money supply changes. This
will allow firms to change labor demand and affect employment, income, and consumption
decisions of households. Therefore, under the nominal wage contract, labor market dynamics
is more important in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy actions rather than in-
tertemporal substitution effects. Following Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988) and Chang and
Kim (2007), it is assumed that a household indivisibly decides hours of work.7 The indivis-
ible labor supply assumption in the heterogeneous-agent model can endogenously generate
aggregate labor supply curves. The degree of heterogeneity in the economy matters for the
shape of reservation wage distributions, thereby affecting the response of real wages and
prices to monetary policy shocks. Thus, aggregate labor supply elasticity, which represents
the shape of reservation wage distributions, can be the main linkage between the long-run
level of inequality and the effectiveness of monetary policy.
To the best of my knowledge, this model framework is the first that considers a mon-
etary neoclassical model with nominal wage contracts, incomplete asset markets, and rich
household heterogeneity.
One of the main findings is that expansionary monetary policy reduces income, con-
sumption, and wealth inequalities. In response to expansionary monetary policy shocks,
the nominal wage contract leads to a fall in real wages,8 and this allows firms to hire more
workers. A rise in employment from the bottom of distributions decreases inequality. There
are heterogeneous effects of monetary policy on income across the wealth distribution. The
different responses of real wages and real asset returns generate compositional effects of mon-
7An interplay between a discrete labor choice and wage rigidity will amplify the transmission of monetary
policy shocks to the labor market.
8There are abundant empirical studies suggesting that real wages are coutercyclical in response to mon-
etary policy shocks. For example, Spencer (1998) provides empirical findings that the real wage response
is strongly and robustly negative in response to demand shocks, which supports sticky-wage theories of the
business cycle including the model economy in this paper. Similarly, Balmaseda, Dolado and Lopez-Salido
(2000) empirically document that real wages are countercyclical in response to aggregate demand shocks.
Leiderman (1983) also finds that real wage response to an unanticipated increase in money growth is weakly
negative.
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etary policy on consumers’ income. The rich benefit from a rise in the real asset returns
while the poor benefit from an increase in employment in a relative sense. There are also
asymmetric responses of consumption between the poor and the rich. Households in the
bottom of the wealth distribution increase consumption while asset-rich households tend to
decrease consumption. This implies that inflation hurts wealthy households more.9
A second important finding is that the long-run level of inequality matters for the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy. The degree of heterogeneity in an economy would determine
the size of aggregate labor supply elasticity (or the shape of the reservation wage distribu-
tion), which affects the responses of real wages and prices to monetary policy shocks. In an
economy with less heterogeneity, labor supply elasticity is larger (or the reservation wage
distribution is more concentrated), which implies that relatively more equal households are
placed around the market wage. Accordingly, the general equilibrium effect would be bigger:
there is a larger decrease in real wages as the price level increases by more, which leads to a
bigger response of output. Therefore, a more equal society is associated with more effective
monetary policy in terms of output, ceteris paribus. I also provide empirical evidence for
this model result using state-level panel data: the effects of monetary policy shocks on GDP
are larger for low-inequality states.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature. Section 3
introduces the heterogeneous-agent model economy with indivisible labor and nominal wage
contracts. The distributional consequences of monetary policy are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 examines the role of the long-run level of inequality in the effectiveness of monetary
policy. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Some recent papers provide an insightful analysis of redistributive effects of monetary
policy. Auclert (2017) investigates redistribution channels of an exogenous monetary policy
9This finding is consistent with Doepke and Schneider (2006). Their empirical results suggest that rich
and old households hurt more from inflation. Similarly, Wong (2018) finds that consumption of younger
people is more responsive to rate shocks.
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shock and finds that the effects of monetary policy on aggregate consumption tend to be
amplified by such redistribution channels. Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018) introduce fi-
nancial market incompleteness in New Keynesian models. In the model of Kaplan, Moll and
Violante (2018), there are two types of assets with different degrees of liquidity and different
returns. Their model successfully reproduces a wealth distribution, also across liquid and
illiquid assets, and a distribution of the marginal propensities to consume (MPC). In this
setting, Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018) find that the indirect effects of an unexpected fall
in interest rates, which operate through a general equilibrium (e.g., an increase in labor de-
mand), dominate the direct effects, which are mainly from intertemporal substitution effects.
Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (2016) consider a model economy in which households
differ in their employment status, earnings, and wealth in the context of New Keynesian
frameworks and study the importance of the earnings and income composition channels. In
their model, matching frictions create countercyclical labor-market risk which is endogenous
to monetary policy. Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (2016) find that contractionary
monetary policy shocks increase inequality since a contractionary shock tends to prolong
unemployment spells, as firms reduce labor demand. Another interesting result that they
find is that a majority of households prefer substantial stabilization of unemployment even if
this means deviations from price stability.10 The current paper differs from previous studies
in the literature on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the presence of incom-
plete markets in that (i) this study focuses more on the distributional effects of discretionary
changes in monetary policy actions;11 (ii) the key monetary transmission mechanism is gen-
erated by employment dynamics induced by nominal wage contracts.12 There are also some
empirical analyses that study how the actions of the monetary authority affect inequality,
10Werning (2015) also studies some of the channels through which heterogeneity and incomplete markets
imply a departure from the aggregate implications of the standard representative agent approach.
11The main focus of Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (2016) is on the heterogeneous welfare effects of
systematic monetary policy while Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018) decompose the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy into direct and indirect general equilibrium effects on aggregate consumption.
12The countercyclical labor-market risks created by matching frictions are important for the transmission
of monetary policy in Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (2016) whereas the key features in Kaplan, Moll
and Violante (2018) are multiple assets with different degrees of liquidity and different returns.
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and contributions are Furceri, Loungani and Zdzienicka (2016) and Coibion et al. (2017).13
Their main finding is that a contractionary monetary policy shock increases inequality, which
is consistent with the model result in this paper.
Most of the previous literature regarding the relation between inequality and monetary
policy have mainly focused on one direction of the relation, the impact of monetary policy
on inequality. The other direction, the effect of the long-run level of inequality on the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy, is relatively unstudied. There are a few studies on the role
of inequality in the effectiveness of monetary policy. Using retail scanner and consumer
panel data, Kim (2017) empirically documents that low-price brands change prices more fre-
quently than high-price brands, and demand for low-price brands has a negative correlation
with household income. Using a menu-cost model with vertically differentiated products and
heterogeneous consumers, he concludes that the impact of monetary policy on real output
decreases when there are more low-income consumers in the economy. Similarly, Cravino,
Lan and Levchenko (2018) provide empirical evidence that the estimated impulse responses
of high-income households’ consumer price indices are lower than those of the middle-income
households. Based on a quantitative New-Keynesian model with heterogeneous households
where sectors are heterogeneous in their frequency of price changes, they conclude that a
realistic change in inequality does not substantially affect the responses of aggregate prices
and output to monetary policy. The current paper contributes to the literature by empha-
sizing the role of different shapes of reservation wage distributions depending on a degree of
inequality in the causal relation between inequality and the effectiveness of monetary policy,
while Kim (2017) and Cravino, Lan and Levchenko (2018) focus on the channels of differ-
ent frequency of price changes and heterogeneous composition of consumption goods across
households. Because of the different key mechanism from those in Kim (2017) and Cravino,
Lan and Levchenko (2018), the main result in the paper contradicts theirs but is supported
13Doepke and Schneider (2006) also empirically document the impacts of inflation through changes in the
value of nominal assets. Their main finding is that that rich and old households are the main losers from
the occurrence of inflation.
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by empirical papers in the literature such as Alpanda and Zubairy (2017) and Voinea, Lovin
and Cojocaru (2018).14 This paper is also related to the literature which discusses the re-
lation between the long-run level of inequality and government spending multiplier (Brinca
et al., 2016; Yang, 2017)15 and studies which investigate an importance of micro-level hetero-
geneity in the propagation of aggregate shocks (e.g., Werning (2015) and Krueger, Mitman
and Perri (2016)).16
This study also contributes to the literature by incorporating uninsurable risks into a
standard real business cycle model with money. The monetary neoclassical models based
on the representative agent have had a lot of success in accounting for many important
macroeconomic issues (e.g. Cooley and Hansen (1989), Cho and Cooley (1995), Janko (2008),
and Floden (2000)).17 However, all these representative-agent models cannot study any
macroeconomic questions regarding distributions and inequality. By introducing uninsurable
risks and household heterogeneity into a monetary neoclassical model, the current paper
investigates not only a propagation of monetary policy shocks to aggregate variables but
also the distributional effects of monetary policy actions. Recent studies in the literature,
including Ragot (2014) and Camera and Chien (2014), also introduce idiosyncratic shocks in
the context of the business cycle models with money. Relative to this literature, the current
14Using Romanian data, Voinea, Lovin and Cojocaru (2018) find a contract result that lower inequality
is associated with stronger effectiveness and higher homogeneity of monetary policy transmission. Alpanda
and Zubairy (2017) also provide empirical evidence that the effects of monetary policy are less powerful
during periods of high household debt.
15Brinca et al. (2016) study the relation between wealth inequality and the magnitude of fiscal multipliers.
Similarly, Yang (2017) investigates the relationship between income inequality and the local government
spending multipliers using rich historical state-level data on military procurement and inequality.
16Werning (2015) argues that the effect of market incompleteness on the interest rate elasticity of aggregate
demand depends on the cyclicality of liquidity and of income risk. Krueger, Mitman and Perri (2016) study
the importance of household heterogeneity for aggregate consumption and output dynamics.
17Cooley and Hansen (1989) consider cash-in-advance constraints in the standard real business cycle
model to analyze if the business cycle depends on inflation states. Cho and Cooley (1995) extend the
model of Cooley and Hansen (1989) by introducing nominal wage contracts and study the quantitative
importance of the wage contracts for business cycle fluctuations. In the context of Cho and Cooley (1995),
Janko (2008) adds labor adjustment costs into a model with nominal wage rigidity and finds that the model
with labor adjustment costs is able to replicate reasonable volatilities of real variables and a countercyclical
productivity. Floden (2000) constructs a business cycle model economy in which money supply is set to
minimize the volatility of inflation and output and finds that small changes in the preferences of a central
bank is able to produce large changes in correlations between real and nominal variables.
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paper focuses more on the distributional effects of monetary policy.18
4.3 Model Economy
I develop a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which employs
a continuum (measure one) of heterogeneous households, a government, and many identical
firms. In the model economy, there are four main assumptions. First, asset markets are
incomplete as in Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) in that households cannot fully in-
sure against their idiosyncratic productivity shocks. This assumption along with borrowing
constrains helps generate substantial heterogeneity across characteristics of individual house-
holds including wealth, income, employment, and consumption. Second, following Hansen
(1985), Rogerson (1988) and Chang and Kim (2007), it is assumed that a household indi-
visibly decides hours of work. As is well-known, extensive margins for time devoted to work
play an important role in accounting for the variation in total hours worked. Particularly,
once indivisible labor is employed in the incomplete asset market model, the aggregate labor
supply elasticity depends on how different individual reservation wages are compared to the
market wage (Chang and Kim, 2006). Third, cash-in-advance constraints are considered
in the standard real business cycle model as in Cooley and Hansen (1989). In this setup,
households should hold money to purchase goods and services. Lastly, as in Cho and Cooley
(1995) and Janko (2008), nominal wage contracts are incorporated into the model economy
to produce a reasonable propagation of monetary policy shocks. Under the nominal wage
contract, labor market dynamics is relatively important in the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy actions rather than intertemporal substitution effects.
18Sterk and Tenreyro (2018) also investigate a redistribution channel for the transmission of monetary
policy focusing on durable purchases using the heterogeneous-agent model with money, but their model is
based on flexible prices.
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4.3.1 Environment
4.3.1.1 Households
Each household maximizes her expected lifetime utility over cash goods c1t, credit goods
c2t, hours of work ht, shown as:
maxE0
 ∞∑
t=0
βt
ψ log c1t + (1− ψ) log c2t − χ h1+1/φt1 + 1/φ

subject to
Ptc1t ≤ mt−1 + trt, (4.1)
Pt(c1t + c2t + at+1) +mt = W ct xtht + (Pt +Rt)at +mt−1 + trt, (4.2)
and
at+1 ≥ b,
where 0 < β < 1 denotes the time discount factor, χ > 0 is a parameter for disutility
from working, ψ is a weight for cash goods, and φ represents labor supply elasticity. There
are two types of consumption goods in the model economy: one is a cash good (denoted by
c1t), and the other is a credit good (denoted by c2t). When a household wants to purchase
cash goods, she is required to hold money. The currency holdings of a household consist
of two sources: money balances carried over from the previous period, mt−1, and a money
transfer from the government, trt. Specifically, a decision on cash goods for a households
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must satisfy cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints as in Equation 4.1, where Pt is the price level.
As in Cooley and Hansen (1989) and others in the literature, it is assumed that the CIA
constraint holds with equality.19
In addition to the CIA constraint, each household faces the budget constraints as in
Equation 4.2. It is assumed that a household is endowed with one unit of physical time,
which she allocates between hours worked and leisure. When a household works for ht
amount of hours, she earns W ct xtht as nominal wage earnings, where W ct is the nominal
contract wage rate for the efficiency unit of labor, and xt denotes her labor productivity.
Importantly, it is assumed that a labor supply decision made by a household is indivisible
following Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988), and Chang and Kim (2007): a household supplies
a fixed amount of hours (ht = h), or she does not work at all (ht = 0). Accordingly, there are
two employment status for each household: employment and non-employment. A household
can save or borrow by trading a claim for financial assets, at, which yields the nominal
rate of return, Rt. The asset markets are incomplete following Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari
(1994): households cannot issue any assets contingent on their future idiosyncratic risks x.
A household faces a borrowing constraint that limits the fixed amount of debt: the assets
holding, at+1, cannot go below b at any time. Since the CIA constraint binds all the time, and
cash goods (c1t) are determined by the CIA constraint, a household makes decisions of credit
goods (c2t), asset holdings (at+1), and money balances (mt), given the budget constraint. It is
assumed that labor productivity, x, follows a stochastic process with transition probabilities
Px(x′|x) = Pr(xt+1 = x′|xt = x) and an AR(1) process in logs:
ln x′ = ρx ln x+ εx, εx ∼ N(0, σx2).
Since households face borrowing constraints and asset-market incompleteness, they will
behave differently in response to monetary policy shocks, depending on individual state
variables.
19As discussed by Cooley and Hansen (1989), a sufficient condition for the CIA to be always binding
is that the time discount factor is smaller than the gross growth rate of money supply. In the standard
calibration case, this condition is generally satisfied.
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4.3.1.2 Firms
The production technology for the representative firms is represented by the function
given by:
F (K,L, Z) ≡ ZKαL1−α,
where Z, K, L and α denote aggregate productivity, aggregate capital, aggregate effective
labor, capital income share, respectively. Given the contract wages, the representative firm
makes decisions for labor and capital demand to maximize current profits such that:
Πt = maxKt,Lt
{
PtZtK
α
t L
1−α
t −W ct Lt −RtKt − PtδKt)
}
,
where δ is the real depreciation rate for capital.
4.3.1.3 The Government
The government takes up the role of printing money and injecting it into the economy,
and it faces the constraint:
PtGt + Tt = Mt −Mt−1,
where Gt is real government expenditure, Tt is total nominal transfer, and Mt is money
supply. Since this study does not focus on the impact of changes in government spending,
it is assumed that Gt is constant over time.20 Accordingly, the total nominal transfer can
be directly financed by changing money supply. The government issues money according to
the following rule:
Mt+1 = gt+1Mt,
where gt+1 is the gross growth rate of money between periods t and t+1. gt+1 is assumed
to evolve according to the autoregression of the form:
log(gt+1) = ρg log(gt) + ωt+1,
20Without loss of generality, Gt is assumed to be zero in every time period.
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and
ωt+1 ∼ N((1− ρg) log(g¯), σg2),
where g¯ represents the gross growth rate of money in the steady state. As mentioned
above, Et[1/gt+1] < 1/β implies that the CIA constraint is binding in every period.
4.3.1.4 Nominal Wage Contract
A nominal rigidity is introduced into the model economy in order to obtain reasonable
effects of monetary policy and to see the importance of labor market for the propagation
of monetary policy. In the model economy, nominal wage rigidity arises from nominal wage
contracts agreed to by households and firms. In this paper, a “contract” means that house-
holds and firms set up rules and agree to follow them. There are three rules in the wage
contract: a wage setting rule, a labor input setting rule, and an employment allocation rule.
The first two are agreements between the firms and households while the last one is a rule
among households. The wage setting rule and the labor input setting rule will be discussed
in this section, and the employment allocation rule will be followed the households’ problem.
4.3.1.4.1 Wage Setting Rule The nominal contract wage rate is determined by both desired
wages and previous contract wages. I use a natural formulation of the contract wages as a
weighted average (in logs) of the wage in the previous period and the desired wage. Formally,
the nominal contract wage rate, W ct , is given by:
W ct = (W ot )
1−λ (W ct−1)λ , (4.3)
where W ot is the nominal desired wage rate, and λ is the nominal wage rigidity index.
Under this assumption, an important issue is how to determine the desired nominal wages.
Regarding this issue, I assume that the nominal desired wages follow the pricing rule from
the frictionless economy where nominal wage contracts are omitted (Cho and Cooley, 1995;
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Janko, 2007). Specifically, as in Chang and Kim (2007), the forecasting function for the
market wage rate is assumed to take log-linear functions of aggregate state variables, Kt and
gt.21 Hence, the nominal desired wage, W ot , is given by:
log(W ot ) = γ1 + γ2 log(Kt) + γ3 log(gt), (4.4)
where Kt is the aggregate capital. Note that the coefficients (γ1, γ2, and γ3) in the
forecasting function are estimated from the economy without the nominal wage contract.
The assumption of desired wages has two interesting features. First, even if the coefficients
are exogenously given, the path of nominal desired wages is endogenously determined since
the series of aggregate capital,Kt, is an outcome in the economy with nominal wage contracts.
Second, if there is no a wage contract in the model economy (λ = 0), then the desired wage
collapses to the market-equilibrium wage in the frictionless economy, and so does the contract
wage.
Labor Input Setting Rule Since the contract wage rates are not equal to the equilibrium
ones, it is also important who decides the aggregate labor input. Following Cho and Cooley
(1995), Floden (2000), and Janko (2008), I assume that it is the representative firm that
determines aggregate effective labor once aggregate shocks are realized. In other words, by
agreeing to a nominal contract wage, households cede the right to choose the total efficiency
unit of labor to the firms.
4.3.1.5 Timing
The timing assumptions of the model is summarized in Figure 4.1. Households enter
with their own asset and money holdings (a, m) brought from the previous period. Then
individual labor productivity shocks, x, and the aggregate money supply shocks, g, are
21As found in Krusell and Smith (1998), a very high precision can be obtained by approximating the
distribution across characteristics of households using the first moment (mean asset, K) of it.
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Figure 4.1: Timing of Event
Timet t+1
HH: Consumption-savingShock : x, g
a, m
Firm: Labor demand
HH: Employment Wage Contract
Note: The figure presents the timing of the event for the model economy. “HH” denotes “households.”
realized. Observing these shocks, firms and households conclude a nominal wage contract.
Given the nominal contract wage, W c, the firms make decisions on aggregate effective labor,
Lc. Households then make decisions of their employment first and determine consumption,
asset and money holdings next. The details on the households’ problem will be discussed in
the next subsection.
4.3.2 Household Problem
Under the wage contract, households should provide the efficiency units of labor that
the firm demands since they agree to cede the right to decide the aggregate effective labor
to the representative firm. In the representative-agent model, it is easy to fulfill the wage
contract for the representative household since all identical households are employed and
supply the same amount of labor. In the heterogeneous-agent model economy, however, the
“employment allocation rule”−how different households allocate their hours−matters given
the aggregate effective labor and the contract wages since reservation wages are different
across households. Since the employment status of a household affects her consumption and
saving decisions, a reasonable assumption of labor supply decisions for households is a critical
issue. To this end, I introduce two sequential steps for households’ problems. The first step
is the employment allocation rule. I assume that in the first step, given the wage contract
(or the aggregate effective labor), households make a decision on their employment. In the
second step, given the wage contract and the employment decisions, households decide how
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much they consume and save. The two steps are summarized as follows:
• Step 1 (Employment decision): given the wage contract, households make a deci-
sion on employment (the employment allocation rule).
• Step 2 (Consumption-saving decision): given the wage contract and employment
decisions, households make consumption-saving decisions.
4.3.2.1 Reservation Wages
Before discussing how households allocates hours in the model economy with the nominal
wage contract, it is useful to consider households’ employment decisions in the frictionless
economy. In the model economy with indivisible labor, a reservation wage rate (per effect
labor) is an important concept for households to make their employment decisions. Define θ
and Θ as the vector of individual and aggregate state variables, respectively: θ ≡ (a,m, x)
and Θ ≡ (µ, g), where µ(θ) is the type distribution of households.22 Let me consider the labor
supply decision for a household. Since the labor supply choice is assumed to be indivisible
(ht = h or ht = 0), there are two employment status for a household: a household is employed
or non-employed. The value function for an employed household, denoted by V E(θ, Θ), is
defined as:
V E(θ, Θ) = maxc1,c2,a′,m′
{
ψ ln c1 + (1− ψ) ln c2 − χh
1+1/φ
1+1/φ + βE [V (θ
′, Θ′)]
}
subject to
Pc1 ≤ m+ tr,
P (c1 + c2 + a′) +m′ = WMxh¯+ (P +R)a+m+ tr, a′ ≥ b,
and
µ′ = Ψ(Θ),
22Denote A,M, and X for sets of all possible realizations of a, m and x, respectively. Then, the measure
µ(a,m, x) is defined over a σ-algebra of A×M×X .
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where WM is the nominal market wage rate, and Ψ denotes a forecasting function for
µ. To simplify notation, time subindices are suppressed, and primes denote variables in the
next period. The value function for a non-employed household, denoted by V N(θ, Θ), is
defined as:
V N(θ, Θ) = maxc1,c2,a′,m′ {ψ ln c1 + (1− ψ) ln c2 + βE [V (θ′, Θ′)]}
subject to
Pc1 ≤ m+ tr,
P (c1 + c2 + a′) +m′ = (P +R)a+m+ tr, a′ ≥ b,
and
µ′ = Ψ(Θ).
Then, the employment decision, h(θ, Θ), for a household is:
max
h∈{0,h}
{
V E(θ, Θ), V N(θ, Θ)
}
. (4.5)
The reservation wage rate, denoted by WR(θ, Θ), is an individual subjective nominal
wage rate (per effective labor) which makes values when working and not working indifferent.
Formally, underWR(θ, Θ), a value function for an employed household, V E(θ, Θ), and a value
function for a non-employed household, V N(θ, Θ), are the same. In the frictionless economy,
a household is employed if the nominal market wage rate (per effective labor), WM , is equal
to or larger than her nominal reservation wage rate (per effect labor), WR(θ, Θ). That is,
h(θ, Θ) =

h¯
0
if WM ≥ WR(θ, Θ)
otherwise
. (4.6)
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Importantly, the reservation wage rate is different across households, depending on net
wealth and productivity.23 Intuitively, WR(θ, Θ) is a decreasing function of labor produc-
tivity, x, and an increasing function of asset holdings, a.24 Accordingly, a household with
a lower reservation wage, or with higher productivity and smaller amount of assets is more
likely to be employed in the frictionless economy.
4.3.2.2 Employment Decision (Employment Allocation Rule)
Next, the employment allocation rule is discussed as follows: how heterogeneous house-
holds determine their employment under the wage contract. Since the contract wage depends
on the contract wage in the previous period, now define Θ ≡ (µ, g,WC−1), where WC−1 is the
contract wage in the previous period. I assume that given the wage contract, households
make a decision on their employment first before making consumption-saving decisions. By
agreeing to cede the right to decide an aggregate efficient labor to the representative firm,
households should provide effective labor that the firm demands. The aggregate effective
labor associated with W c (the current nominal contract wage) is denoted by Lc. Suppose
that W˜ is the wage rate at which households endogenously provide effective labor of Lc.
Note that W˜ is different from W c but a function of W c. In order to fulfill the wage contract,
a household, whose reservation wage rate is less than or equal to W˜ , should work. Formally,
now the employment decision for a household is given by:
h(θ, Θ) =

h¯
0
if W˜ ≥ WR(θ, Θ)
otherwise
. (4.7)
In other words, households solve Equation 4.5 under W˜ instead ofWM .25 With the fulfillment
of the wage contract, the following condition must be satisfied:
23Of course, it is also dependent on aggregate states in the economy.
24In the next section, I will discuss the distribution of the reservation wage rate over individual state
variables.
25Note that V (θ,Θ) is determined in the second step (after h(θ,Θ) is obtained) in the model with the
wage contract while V (θ,Θ) and h(θ,Θ) will be jointly determined in the frictionless economy.
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Lc(Θ) =
∫
xh(θ, Θ)dµ.
It should be noted that even if employment decisions are made endogenously under W˜ ,
some are voluntarily (non-)employed while others are involuntarily (non-)employed because
of the wage contracts. Of course, the size of the involuntary labor choices depends on aggre-
gate states in the economy and the wage rigidity index. As discuss above, this is a reasonable
assumption of employment decisions for households is that households are employed in as-
cending order by their reservation wage rates (per effective labor) until they provide Lc as
in the economy with no wage contracts.
4.3.2.3 Consumption-saving Decision
In the second step, given the wage contract and the employment decisions, households
decide how much they consume and save. It is assumed that given employment status,
h(θ, Θ), decisions for c1, c2, a′, and m′ are made under the contract wage, W c, such that:
V (θ, Θ) = maxc1,c2,a′,m′
{
ψ ln c1 + (1− ψ) ln c2 − χh(θ,Θ)1+1/φ1+1/φ + βE [V (θ′, Θ′)]
}
subject to
Pc1 ≤ m+ tr,
P (c1 + c2 + a′) +m′ = W cxh(θ, Θ) + (P +R)a+m+ tr, a′ ≥ b,
and
µ′ = Ψ(Θ).
To sum up, the employment decisions, h(θ, Θ), are made under W˜ to fulfill the wage
contract (to supply the effective labor that the firm demands), while consumption-investment
decisions (c2(θ, Θ), a′(θ, Θ) and m′(θ, Θ)) are made under W c.
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4.3.3 Definition of Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is a transition operator Ψ(Θ), a set of factors {K(Θ), Lc(Θ)} ,
a set of value functions {V E(θ, Θ),V N(θ, Θ), V (θ, Θ)}, a set of prices
{
WC(Θ), W˜ (Θ), P (Θ), R(Θ)
}
,
and a set of policy functions {c1(θ, Θ), c2(θ, Θ),m′(θ, Θ),a′(θ, Θ),h(θ, Θ)} such that:
1. Nominal wage contracts
• Contract wage setting rule:
W c = (W o)1−λ
(
W c−1
)λ
,
• A household, whose reservation wage rate is less than or equal to W˜ , should work,
i.e.,
h(θ, Θ) = h¯ if W˜ ≥ WR(θ, Θ).
• Households supply the effective labor that the firm demands:
Lc(Θ) =
∫
xh(θ, Θ)dµ.
2. Individual optimization: givenW c and h(θ, Θ), optimal decision rules c1(θ, Θ), c2(θ, Θ),
a′(θ, Θ), and m′(θ, Θ) solve the Bellman equation, V (θ, Θ).
3. The firm’s profit maximization: givenW c, K(Θ) and Lc(Θ) satisfy FL(K,Lc) = W
C(Θ)
P (Θ)
and FK(K,Lc)− δ = R(Θ)P (Θ) for all Θ.
4. Markets clearing: for all Θ,
• capital market clearing: K(Θ) = ∫ adµ, and
• goods market clearing: ZK(Θ)αLc(Θ)1−α = C(Θ)+I(Θ) where C(Θ) = ∫ c1(θ, Θ)dµ+∫
c2(θ, Θ)dµ, and I(Θ) = K ′(Θ)− (1− δ)K(Θ).
5. Balanced budget of the government: PG+ T = M ′ −M .
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6. Consistency of individual and aggregate behaviors: for all A0 ⊂ A, M0 ⊂ M, and
X0 ⊂ X ,
µ′(A0,M0, X0) =
∫
A0,M0,X0
{∫
A,M,X 1a′=a′(θ,Θ),m′=m′(θ,Θ)dPx(x′|x)dµ
}
da′dm′dx′.
4.3.4 Calibration
In this section, I discuss calibration for the parameters used in the model economy. A
simulation period is a quarter in the model. Table 4.1 summarizes the parameter values used
in the model economy.
4.3.4.1 Preference
The parameter φ, which represents the micro elasticity of labor supply, is set to 0.4. This
value is based on the findings that conventional micro estimates of the elasticity of labor
supply are small (0 − 0.5). Since labor supply is assumed to be discrete, the value of φ
does not affect the aggregate labor-supply elasticity, and it is determined by the shape of
the reservation-wage distribution. According to the Michigan Time-Use Survey, a typical
household spends around one third of her discretionary time for working. Hence, fixed
amount of hours worked, h, is chosen to be 1/3. The time discount factor, β, and the
disutility parameter of working, χ, are set so that quarterly return to capital is one percent,
and the employment rate is 60 percent, respectively.26 The U.S. data such as the PSID and
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) consistently report that employment rates are around
60 percent.27 According to Bagnall et al. (2016), the share of payments by value done with
cash by US consumers is 23 percent, and the share of average transaction values done with
cash is 17.8 percent. Based on these measures, the parameter for the share of cash goods,
ψ, is chosen to be 20 percent.
26The discount factor, β, in the heterogeneous-agent model is smaller than that in the representative-
agent model, because market incompleteness makes households increase precautionary savings as noted in
Aiyagari (1994).
27Self-employed workers are excluded for the calculation of employment rates.
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Table 4.1: Parameters of the Model Economy
Parameter Value Description Source/Target Moments
Literature or Data Directly
h 1/3 Extensive margin for hours worked Standard
φ 0.4 Labor supply elasticity Standard
ψ 0.20 Share of cash goods Bagnall et al. (2016)
ρx 0.939 Persistence of x shocks Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2013)
σx 0.287 Standard deviation of x shocks Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2013)
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate Standard
α 0.36 Capital income share Standard
ρg 0.8 Persistence of g shocks Christiano (1991)
σg 0.004 Standard deviation of g shocks Christiano (1991)
g¯ 1.012 Steady state g Janko (2008)
λ 0.8 Wage rigidity index Smets and Wouters (2003)
Calibrated
β 0.97782 Time discount factor Real return to capital
b -3.0 Borrowing constraint Doubled average quarterly earnings
χ 145.8 Parameter for disutility from working Employment rate
Note: The table summarizes the parameter values used in the model economy. Parameters in the upper panel are from the
literature or data directly while parameters in the bottom panel are chosen to match data moments.
4.3.4.2 Production and Borrowing Constraint
Parameter values for production are quite standard. Since this study does not focus on the
impact of aggregate productivity shocks, it is assumed that Zt is constant at 1 over time.
The capital income share, α, and the quarterly depreciation rate, δ, are calibrated to be 0.36
and 2.5 percent, respectively. The borrowing constraint, b, is -3.0, which is approximately
twice of the quarterly average earnings in the model economy.28 With this value, the fraction
of households who own zero or negative wealth is around 20 percent, which is consistent with
that in the U.S. data such as the PSID.
28Similarly, Chang and Kim (2006) also choose the borrowing constraint to target one and a half of
quarterly earnings for a household who has the average-productivity.
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Table 4.2: Transition Probabilities for Money Supply Shock
t+1
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
t
g1 0.40 0.37 0.18 0.05 0.01
g2 0.22 0.35 0.29 0.12 0.03
g3 0.09 0.24 0.34 0.24 0.09
g4 0.03 0.12 0.29 0.35 0.22
g5 0.01 0.05 0.18 0.37 0.40
Note: Transition probabilities per quarter. gi denotes a money growth grid i. Rounding for the table means
rows may not sum to 1.
4.3.4.3 Labor Productivity
For individual labor productivity shocks, previous studies in the literature including Floden
and Linde (2001), Chang and Kim (2006), and Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2013) consis-
tently report that the shocks are persistent, and the variance is also large. Following Chang,
Kim and Schorfheide (2013), I set ρx = 0.939 and σx = 0.287, which are estimated with
the AR(1) wage process from the PSID.29 The number of grids for labor productivity is 15.
Grid vectors of productivity are equally spaced in which ln x lies between −3σx
√
1− ρ2x and
3σx
√
1− ρ2x. Transition probabilities of productivity are approximated using Tauchen (1986)
algorithm and are shown in Table ??.
4.3.4.4 Money Supply and Wage Contract
Regarding the money supply shocks, Christiano (1991) estimate values for the parameters of
the money growth process, ρg and σg, using the U.S. time series data. Following his estimate,
I choose ρg = 0.8 and σg = 0.004. The steady-state rate of gross money growth is assumed
to be 1.015.30 The number of grids for money growth is 5. Grid vectors of productivity are
equally spaced in which ln g lies between −3σg
√
1− ρ2g and 3σg
√
1− ρ2g. Transition probabil-
ities of money growth are also approximated using Tauchen (1986) algorithm and are shown
29Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2013) use the maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) when they estimate
the AR(1) process of wage rates in logs to solve the self-selection problem for wage workers.
30This value is very standard in the literature. For example, Janko (2008) find that the estimate of the
parameter value is 1.012.
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Table 4.3: Key Aggregate Moments
Moment Data Model
Targeted Moment
Employment rate 0.60 0.60
Real capital return 0.01 0.01
Untargeted Moment
Income Gini 0.57 0.59
Wealth Gini 0.78 0.68
Consumption Gini 0.30 0.33
Flow out of employment 6.82 5.60
Flow into employment 7.01 5.60
Note: Information for income and wealth in the data are from Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997), while statistics for
consumption is the Consumer Expenditures Survey (CEX) average for the period 1980-2008. The measure for the employment
flows is from the working paper of Chang and Kim (2006).
in Table 4.2. The index for nominal wage rigidity is set to 0.8, which is in the range of the
values typically used in the literature. For example, Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate a
degree of nominal wage sickness and find that it is 0.74, which is the median in the posterity
distribution.
4.4 The Effects of Monetary Policy on Inequality
4.4.1 Aggregate Moments and Cross-sectional Distributions
First, I present the main results of aggregate moments. I summarize the data and the
model counterparts of the targeted (upper panel) and untargeted moments (bottom panel)
in Table 4.3. The model economy fits well the targeted moments by construction, thus
we mainly examine the fit of the model to the data in terms of the untargeted moments.
Table 4.4 summarizes the shares of income, wealth and consumption for the data and the
model economy. The model economy reasonably replicates the income distribution of the
U.S., making the income Gini index of the simulated model 0.59, which is comparable to the
data (0.57). The inequality of wealth distribution in the model economy is less concentrated
compared to the U.S. data: the model economy makes the wealth Gini index about 0.68
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Table 4.4: Three Key Distributions
Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Gini
U.S. Data
Share of Income 2.18 6.63 11.80 19.47 59.91 0.57
Share of Wealth -0.39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 0.78
Share of Consumption 11.02 15.07 18.07 22.53 33.31 0.30
Model Economy
Share of Income 0.81 4.57 11.15 23.10 60.37 0.59
Share of Wealth -2.70 2.00 10.00 24.55 66.15 0.68
Share of Consumption 6.49 12.50 17.57 24.02 39.42 0.33
Note: Information for income and wealth in the data are from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 1992 in Diaz-Gimenez,
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997), while statistics for consumption is the Consumer Expenditures Survey (CEX) average for the
period 1968-2015.
while it is 0.78 in the U.S. data. Consumption inequality is also well replicated by the
model: Gini index for consumption is 0.33 in the model, which is similar to what is observed
in the U.S. data (0.30). In the U.S data, on average, 6.82 percent of the population moved
from employment to nonemployment each quarter; 7.01 percent of the population moved in
the opposite direction, from nonemployment to employment. In the model, these flows are
5.60 percent. Although I do not calibrate the model to match these values, the worker flows
are fairly close to those in the U.S. data.
4.4.2 The Aggregate Effects of Monetary Policy
In this subsection, I discuss the transmission of an expansionary one-standard-deviation
monetary policy shock (positive money growth shocks). The responses of key aggregate
variables in the model economy to a one-standard-deviation monetary policy (money growth)
shocks for 20 quarters of horizon are shown in Figure 4.2. The mechanism of the effects of
an unexpected rise in money supply on real economic activity in the model is through the
nominal wage contract. An unexpected rise in the money growth leads to a higher price
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Figure 4.2: Impulse-responses of Aggregate Variables
Note: Impulse response to a one-standard-deviation monetary policy (money growth) shock. All variables other than interest
rates are logged. The x-axis shows time since the shock in quarters.
level: it increases by 0.20 percentage.31 Accordingly, real wages drop (by 0.16 percent),
and real capital returns increase (by 0.99 percent points) due to the nominal wage contract.
A fall in the rental price for labor allows the firms to hire more workers. Accordingly,
hours (employment) and output increase significantly (by 0.82 percent and 0.32 percent,
respectively). A rise in price level decreases demand for cash goods, while credit goods
increase because of a rise in income, which leads to a smoothly rise in total consumption.
Total consumption rises by 0.03 percent at the peak. It should be also noted that a rise
in involuntary employment also contributes to an increase in credit goods since households
who are forced to work by the wage contract increase their consumption to compensate for
increased disutility from working. Investment also increases markedly (by 1.41 percent) due
to a portfolio change caused by the higher price level and a rise in the real asset return.32
The dynamics of most of the macro variables in the model economy is well supported by
empirical studies in the literature including Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
31Following studies in the literature (e.g., Cho and Cooley (1995) and Floden (2000)), the price level is
divided by aggregate money stock to make it stationary.
32Of course, a rise in total income also contributes to an increase in investment.
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4.4.3 Heterogeneous-agent vs. Representative-agent Models
At this stage in the analysis, one question may arise: what is the difference between
the heterogeneous-agent model (HA model) and the representative-agent model (RA model)
which has been studied in the previous literature? The basic assumptions for the nominal
wage contacts in the RA model are the same as those in the HA model other than the
employment decisions for households. In the RA model, households are not able to decide
who works or not as in the HA model since they are assumed to be identical. Hence, I
assume that in the RA model, given the contract wage, all the identical households provide
Lc, which is determined by firm’s profit maximization condition. This assumption is widely
used in the literature such as Cho and Cooley (1995), Floden (2000), and Janko (2008). For
calibration strategy for the RA model, I choose β = 0.99 to match a one percent quarterly
return to capital, and disutility parameter of working, χ, is chosen to target the aggregate
hours of 0.2, as in the HA model (60 employment rate×1/3). Importantly, the labor supply
elasticity, φ, is chosen to be 1.14, which is the same as the aggregate labor supply elasticity
generated by the HA model.33
Figure 4.3 presents the impact of a one-standard-deviation expansionary monetary shock
for the HA model and the RA model. The solid lines show the response in the economy
with heterogeneous households, while the dotted lines report the response in the economy
with a representative household. A striking feature in the HA model is that hours increase
significantly by more than those in the RA model, even though the model economies are
assumed to have the same aggregate labor supply elasticity. The difference is mainly due to
how households allocate their hours in the two economies. In both models, by agreeing to a
nominal contract wage, households should supply the total efficiency unit of labor that the
firms want. What is different in the two models is how households make decisions of their
labor supply. In the HA model, it is assumed that households are employed in ascending
order by their reservation wage rates (per effective labor) until they provide Lc. Hence,
33Chang and Kim (2007) also use the same calibration strategy for their RA model.
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Figure 4.3: Impulse-responses of Aggregate Variables: HA vs. RA models
Note: Impulse response to a one-standard-deviation monetary policy (money growth) shock. All variables other than interest
rates are logged. The x-axis shows time since the shock in quarters. The solid blue lines show the response in the economy
with heterogeneous households, while the dotted lines report the response in the economy with a representative household.
households whose reservation wage rates are slightly higher than the contract wage tend to
be newly employed. Since the reservation wage is a decreasing function of productivity, less
productive households newly work. Accordingly, given the demand for aggregate effective
labor, more employed households are needed in the HA model to fulfill the wage contract
since newly employed households are less productive. In the RA counterpart, however, all
the households have the same productivity, which is the average productivity in the HA
model. The efficient unit of labor provided by the newly employed households in the RA
model is larger than that in the HA model. Hence, hours increase significantly by less in the
RA model compared to those in the HA model.
Another interesting feature is that households in the HA model have a smoother con-
sumption path than those in the RA counterpart. Households who are forced to work by
the wage contract are likely to increase their consumption to compensate for the reduction
of utility from involuntarily working. In the RA model, consumption will increase by more
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than that in the HA model since every household is forced to work more. However, credits
goods do not jump substantially in the HA model since consumption dynamics is not only
affected by households who work involuntarily, and precautionary saving behaviors of vol-
untary workers stop credits goods from increasing by more.34 As found in Figure 4.3, credit
goods in the RA model dramatically increase on impact while those in the HA model have
a relatively smooth path. In the RA model, at the cost of a rise in consumption on impact,
investment increases by less than that of the HA counterpart. On net, output on impact rises
by more in the HA economy than that in the RA economy. Additional general equilibrium
effects also play important a role in generating the larger of output in the HA model. A
money demand also increases by more in the HA model than that in the RA counterpart
due to the smooth consumption response, which leads to a larger increase in the price level
and output in the HA model.
4.4.4 Behaviors of Marginal Workers
In response to an unexpected monetary expansion, by agreeing to the nominal wage con-
tract, households whose reservation wage rates are closed to contract wage are employed
since they should supply the total efficiency unit of labor that the firms demand. House-
holds who are newly employed because of the wage contract are likely to behave differently
from the ones who are voluntarily working. As briefly mentioned above, for example, a rise
in involuntary employment contributes to an increase in credit goods since households who
are forced to work by the wage contract may increase their consumption to compensate for
increased welfare costs from voluntarily working. In this subsection, I discuss the behaviors
of this type of households. To this end, let me first define a marginal worker in the econ-
omy. Define V E(θ, Θ, W˜ ) a value function for a employed household under W˜ . V N(θ, Θ, W˜ ),
V E(θ, Θ,W c), and, V N(θ, Θ,W c) can be defined in a similar way. A household is defined as
a marginal worker if
34Intuitively, aggregate response of credit goods depend on the marginal worker distribution in the econ-
omy. I will discuss this issue later.
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V E(θ, Θ, W˜ ) ≥ V N(θ, Θ, W˜ ) and V E(θ, Θ,W c) < V N(θ, Θ,W c) (4.8)
or
V E(θ, Θ, W˜ ) < V N(θ, Θ, W˜ ) and V E(θ, Θ,W c) ≥ V N(θ, Θ,W c). (4.9)
Equation 4.8 or 4.9 implies that a marginal work does not want to work under the contract
wages but should work by the wage contract, or she wants to work under the contract wages
but cannot work by the contract. Figure 4.4 reports the responses of key per capita vari-
ables for marginal workers and non-marginal workers in response to an unexpected increase
in money supply.35 As expected, the last column of the figure shows that the population
of marginal workers increases due to the wage contract. This implies that the aggregate
hours variation is largely driven by a rise in the marginal worker population share. Inter-
estingly, marginal workers tend to consume more in compensation for a rise in welfare costs
from working: average consumption for marginal workers increases. Not surprisingly, they
also increase savings in terms of money holdings. However, non-marginal workers decrease
consumption and saving. This implies that, from the general equilibrium perspective, these
behaviors of marginal workers lead to a rise in the price level by increasing demand for
money.
To sum up, in response to an unexpected rise in money supply, the population of marginal
workers marginal rises, and they tend to increase consumption and savings more than others.
This result leads to an important implication for the relation between the effectiveness mone-
tary policy and inequality. Since marginal workers behave differently from other households,
a general equilibrium effect depends on the distribution of marginal workers.36 An economy
35The responses show level changes and the size of responses is normalized by the population share.
36The distribution of marginal workers affects the population size of these households in the economy and
the gap between the values functions,
∣∣∣V E(θ,Θ, W˜ )− V N (θ,Θ,W c)∣∣∣ or ∣∣∣V N (θ,Θ, W˜ )− V E(θ,Θ,W c)∣∣∣.
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Figure 4.4: Behaviors of Marginal Workers
Note: The figure shows the responses of key per capita variables for marginal workers and non-marginal workers in response
to an unexpected increase in money supply. Marginal workers are defined in Equation 4.8 and 4.9. The responses show level
changes and the size of responses is normalized by the population share.
with a different level of inequality has a different marginal worker distribution, and therefore
the effectiveness monetary policy will be different. I will discuss this issue in detailed in
Section 5.
4.4.5 Distributional Effects of Monetary Policy
4.4.5.1 Reservation Wages Distribution
It is also useful to discuss the reservation wage distribution generated by the model econ-
omy to have better understanding of the employment decisions for households in the model
economy, which is one of the key mechanism for monetary policy shocks. Figure 4.5 shows
the reservation wage rate (per effective labor), WR(θ, Θ), distribution over labor productiv-
ity and net wealth in the model economy. As briefly discussed earlier, the reservation wage
rate is different across households types: as expected, it is an increasing function of net asset
holdings but is a decreasing function of labor productivity.
From this figure, we can have two implications. First, as discussed in Chang and Kim
(2006), the aggregate labor supply responses depend on how different are individual reser-
vation wages compared to the market wage. In other words, a marginal worker distribution
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Figure 4.5: Reservation Wage Rate (per effective labor) Distribution
Note: The figure shows the per effective reservation wage distribution over productivity and assets.
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Figure 4.6: The Effects of Monetary Policy on Gini Coefficients
Note: The figure depicts the effects of one-standard-deviation expansionary monetary policy shocks on Gini coefficients of
income, earnings, wealth, and consumption (cash goods, credit goods, and total consumption). The Gini coefficients are logged,
so the responses are percentage deviations from the steady state.
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Figure 4.7: Responses of Relative Income and Hours over Income
Note: The figure shows responses of relative income to average and hours between the bottom and the top 40 percent of income.
can be determined by the reservation wage distribution. Since the shape of reservation wage
distribution will depend on productivity and wealth distributions, a marginal worker distri-
bution also will rely on the inequality status of the economy. I will discuss this issue in detail
in Section 5.
Second, by assumption, households are employed in an ascending order by their reser-
vation wage rates (per effective labor) until they provide what the firms demand. Hence,
households whose reservation wage rates were slightly higher than the contract wage are
likely to be newly employed in response to monetary policy shocks. In other words, since the
reservation wage is a decreasing function of productivity and an increasing function of assets,
employment of households with relatively low productivity or higher wealth will be mostly
affected by changes in monetary policy actions. This implies that monetary policy can have
substantially different effects on households in the economy, depending on their reservation
wages. The distributional effects of monetary policy shocks will be discussed next.
4.4.5.2 The Effect of Monetary Policy on Inequality
One of the main focuses of this study is on the distributional effects of monetary policy
shocks. Substantially different reservation wages across households suggest that monetary
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policy shocks could have sizable effects on inequality in the economy. Figure 4.6 depicts the
effects of one-standard-deviation expansionary monetary policy shocks on Gini coefficients
of income, earnings, wealth, and consumption (cash goods, credit goods, and total consump-
tion). An expansionary monetary policy shock, indeed, decreases inequality in wealth, earn-
ings, income, and consumption, as is suggested by the empirical literature such as Furceri,
Loungani and Zdzienicka (2016) and Coibion et al. (2017). A one-standard-deviation expan-
sionary monetary policy (money growth) shock reduces Gini coefficients of earnings, income,
and consumption by 0.57, 0.54, and 0.07 percent, respectively. Since wealth is a state vari-
able, it does not respond immediately, but its inequality decreases slowly after a monetary
policy shock: the Gini coefficient of wealth falls by 0.03 percent after 5 quarters of the shock.
Overall, the transmission channel through which an unanticipated monetary easing affects
inequality in the model economy is through an increase in employment from the bottom of
distributions induced by nominal wage contracts. Firms hire more workers after a mone-
tary expansion due to a fall in real wages. As discussed above, newly employed households
tend to be less productive. This implies that employment is likely to arise at the bottom of
distributions since less productive households tend to belong to the bottom. This generally
holds for income, earnings and consumption distributions since labor income is the main
source of total income and consumption dynamics is largely affected by changes in income.
Regarding the wealth distribution, one may argue that an unexpected increase in money
supply would increase wealth inequality since newly employed households may be wealthy in
that the reservation wage is also an increasing function of wealth. However, if new workers in
the top of wealth distribution have relatively smaller productivity than the newly employed
households in the bottom, wealth inequality can decrease after the monetary easing. In this
model economy, these two effects indeed coexists, but wealth inequality falls as the latter
effect dominates.
As an example of the distributional effects of monetary policy shocks, I show the responses
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Figure 4.8: Decomposition of Income Share Responses
Note: The figure shows changes in levels of total income, labor income, and capital income to expansionary monetary policy
shocks.
of relative income to average and hours over the income distribution in Figure 4.7. As
explained above, income-poor households tend to be newly employed in response to an
unexpected rise in money supply: hours at the bottom 40 percent increase by 6 percent.
The increase in employment from the bottom of the income distribution leads to a fall in
income inequality: the relative income for the poor (the bottom 40 percent) increases while
the rich (the top 40 percent) lose their income in a relative sense, which makes the income
Gini coefficient decrease by around 0.4 percent on impact.
Another interesting implication of the distributional effects of monetary policy is from
the different responses of real wages and real asset prices. The former increases employment
and in turn labor income while the latter leads to a rise in capital income. Hence, the
different responses of factor rental prices result in asymmetric effects on income, depending
on how households compose their income. To better understand how the different responses
of real wages and real asset prices have compositional impacts, I decompose the responses of
the level of income across the wealth distribution into two income sources, labor and capital
incomes, in Figure 4.8 and Table 4.5. As shown in Figure 4.8, the increase in total income
for the poor is mainly due to a huge rise in labor income which is induced by an increase
in employment. For example, as found in Table 4.5, an increase in income on impact for
households in the second wealth group is mostly explained by a rise in labor income: the
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Table 4.5: Decomposition of Income Responses on Impact
Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Level Change
Total Income 0.10 0.13 0.30 0.62 1.11
Labor Income 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.44 0.62
Capital Income -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.49
Contribution Rate (%)
Total Income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Labor Income 124.59 93.01 77.43 71.32 56.10
Relative to mean 1.50 1.08 0.94 0.82 0.66
Capital Income -24.59 6.99 22.57 28.68 43.90
Relative to mean -1.86 0.53 1.37 2.04 2.92
Note: The upper panel shows a income level change to expansionary monetary policy shocks on impact, and the bottom panel
shows contribution rates of each income sources to the total income change.
contribution rate of labor income to the rise in total income is 93 percent while it is only
7 percent for capital income. Relative contribution rates for labor income at the bottom
of the wealth distribution is relatively large: it is 1.5 for the poorest wealth group but is
only 0.66 at the top. This means that labor income of asset-poor households is relatively
important when comparing it to their capital income and to labor income in other asset-rich
groups. Interestingly, since an unexpected monetary expansion positively affects the real
asset returns, capital income considerably rises for richer households. According to Table
4.5, the contribution of capital income increases with the level of asset holdings. For example,
the contribution rate of capital income to the rise in total income is 44 percent for the top
wealth group, which is three times as large as the mean. This implies that a rise in real asset
return sharply increases capital income in the upper wealth quintiles. Therefore, there are
compositional effects of monetary policy on income across the wealth distribution: the poor
benefit from an increase in employment whereas the rich benefit from a rise in the real asset
returns in a relative sense.
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Figure 4.9: Responses of Consumption and Hours across Wealth Quintiles
Note: The upper panel depicts the responses of cash goods, credit goods, and total consumption to expansionary monetary
policy shocks across the wealth quintiles, and the bottom shows the responses of hours across the wealth quintiles.
Importantly, there are asymmetric responses of consumption across the wealth distribu-
tion. The upper panel in Figure 4.9 exhibits the responses of cash goods, credit goods, and
total consumption by the wealth quintiles to an unexpected rise in money supply. As far as
cash goods are concerned, a rise in the price level hurts asset-rich households in the economy:
households in the upper wealth quintiles (third to fifth wealth groups) reduce cash goods.
This is because higher inflation plays a role in a rise in consumption taxes, and in particular,
the wealthiest reduce cash goods significantly relative to other households. Households in
the first and second wealth groups increase their cash goods since a sudden rise in the money
transfer injected by the government dominates the effect caused by price level increase. Since
all the wealth quintiles supply more hours to the firms as found in the bottom panel of Fig-
ure 4.9, their labor income rises,37 and this rise allows households to increase their credit
37Of course, a reduction in real wages can decrease labor income to some extents, but a rise in hours may
dominate this effect.
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goods on average. On net, households in the bottom of the wealth distribution increase total
consumption (the sum of cash and credit goods) while asset-rich households tend to decrease
total consumption. Therefore, inflation hurts wealthy households more. This model result
may support the empirical findings in the literature (e.g., Doepke and Schneider (2006)).
4.4.6 Empirical Evidence
I provide empirical evidence for the key mechanism or results in the model economy. I first
discuss an empirical analysis on the cyclicality of real wages and real asset prices in response
to monetary policy shocks. I then empirically document the heterogeneous responses of
consumption and employment.
4.4.6.1 Responses of Real Wages and Real Asset Prices
In the model economy, sluggish adjustment of real wages is central for understanding
the monetary transmission mechanism. Also, a rise in real asset returns is important in
explaining the effects on asset-rich households. To estimate the response of real wages or
real asset returns to monetary policy shock, I consider a three-variable Vector Autoregressive
(VAR) model, including the measure of monetary policy shocks,38 federal funds rates, and
real wages or real asset prices. I consider the following reduced-form VAR,
Yt = A(L)Yt−1 + vt, (4.10)
where Yt is a vector including the monetary policy shock measure, federal funds rates, and
logged real wages or real asset prices, A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator; vt ∼ N(0, Ω)
are reduced-form innovations. The structural innovations, ξt ∼ N(0, I), are defined by an
orthonormal rotation of the reduced-form residuals:
38Measures for monetary policy shocks are from Coibion et al. (2017). They update the measure of Romer
and Romer (2004) until the fourth quarter of 2008.
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Figure 4.10: Responses of Real Wage and Real Asset Prices
Note: The figure shows the responses of real wages and real asset prices to an expansionary monetary policy shock. Real wages
are defined as average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees for total private deflated by producer price
index for all commodities; real house prices are real residential property prices; real stock prices are defined as total share prices
for all shares deflated by price index for all urban consumers for all items.
ξt = B0vt, (4.11)
where B−10 (B−10 )′ = Ω. I order the measures for monetary policy shocks first and real
wages or real asset prices last in the VAR and identify the matrix B−10 using the Cholesky
decomposition of Ω. Constant terms, fourth-degree-polynomial trend terms, and four lags
are included in the VAR. As discussed in Anderson, Inoue and Rossi (2016), by including
the shocks measures in a VAR where the shock is ordered first, we can ensure that the
shock is uncorrelated with past information contained in the other variables in the VAR,
and other variables response to the shocks contemporaneously. Real wages are defined as
average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees for total private.39 Real
house price is real residential property prices, and real stock price are defined total share
prices for all shares.40
39It is deflated by producer price index for all commodities
40Real stock prices are computed by deflating them by price index for all urban consumers for all items
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The responses of real wages and real asset prices to an expansionary monetary policy
shock are reported in Figure 4.10. I first discuss the dynamic behavior of real wages. As
expected by the model economy, the real wage drops after a monetary easing as shown in the
second column. The real wage rate decreases on impact and has a smallest value in 5 quarters
after the shock. This empirical result is inconsistent with that in Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005), who find that the real wage is mildly procyclical in response to monetary
policy shocks.41 However, there are also abundant empirical evidence suggesting that real
wage is coutercyclical in response to monetary policy shocks. For example, Spencer (1998)
provides empirical findings that the real wage response is strongly and robustly negative
in response to demand shocks, which supports sticky-wage theories of the business cycle
including the model economy in this paper. Similarly, Balmaseda, Dolado and Lopez-Salido
(2000) empirically document that real wages are countercyclical in response to aggregate
demand shocks. Leiderman (1983) also finds that real wage response to an unanticipated
increase in money growth is weakly negative.42
As discussed by Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018), having asset price movements con-
sistent with empirical evidence is potentially important in understanding the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. Werning (2015) also shows that the response of consumption
to monetary policy shock depends on the cyclical movement of asset prices. In light of this
discussion in the literature, cyclical real asset returns generated in the model economy are
well supported by empirical evidence. The third and fourth columns show the responses of
real stock prices and real house prices, respectively, to an unanticipated monetary easing.
Consistent with the model assumptions, both real asset prices increase with an unexpected
monetary expansion. The response of the real house price is smoother that of the real stock
41Gamber and Joutz (1993) also find in general a positive dynamic response of real wages to monetary
policy shocks.
42One possible reason why there is no broad agreement among researchers on the basic empirical facts
regarding wage rigidity is that real wages are hard to measure, and it is difficult to know whether observed
wages are allocative (Basu and House, 2016). Regarding this issue, Lastrapes (2002) concludes that the
reason for the disaggrement is a lack of robustness of the estimated wage response functions to model
specification, data transformation to induce stationarity, the choice of proxy for the aggregate real wage,
and the choice of variables to include in the VAR.
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Figure 4.11: Response of Employment across Income Quintiles
Note: The figure presents the responses of employment across different income quintiles to an expansionary monetary policy
shock.
price, which suggests that there are more frictions in the housing market. Empirical stud-
ies (e.g., Furceri, Loungani and Zdzienicka (2016)) in the literature also find the consistent
results.
To sum up, the dynamic behaviors of both the real wages and real asset prices in the
model economy are well supported by the empirical results.
4.4.6.2 Heterogeneous Responses of Employment
I also provide supportive empirical evidence for the different responses of employment
across income groups to monetary policy shocks, which is the key channel of the model. For
this analysis, I use the Current Population Survey (CPS). Since information on income in
the CPS is available in March of every year, I cannot use quarterly data for employment
rates across income quintiles. Hence, I use annual data spanning 1969 to 2008. To estimate
the effects of monetary policy shocks on employment by income, I employ the VAR where
the monetary policy shocks measure are ordered first, and constant terms, quadratic trend
terms, and a one-period lag are included. Figure 4.11 reports the estimated response of
employment rates across income groups. As predicted by the model economy, households in
the lower income quintiles increase employment while employment rates for richer households
tend to decrease in response to expansionary monetary policy shocks.
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4.4.6.3 Heterogeneous Responses of Consumption
I also provide empirical evidence that there are heterogeneous responses of consumption
to monetary policy shocks. To this end, I use the Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CEX),
which is conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), to collect information on con-
sumption and age across individual households.43 I mainly use quarterly data which span
from the first quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 2008. The measure of non-durable con-
sumption includes food and beverages, tobacco, apparel and services, personal care, gasoline,
public transportation, household operation, medical care, entertainment, reading material
and education. The definition of the non-durable goods is similar to that of Anderson, In-
oue and Rossi (2016) and De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012).44 Non-durable consumption for
households is real per capita values: they are divided by family size (the number of family
members), deflated by CPI-U series, and seasonally adjusted by X-12-ARIMA. Since net
wealth data are not available not even for every year, I use age dimension as a proxy for
asset holdings. The measure of age is defined as the age of a head of each household.
I order the measures for monetary policy shocks first, federal funds rates next, and
consumption for each age group last in the VAR. Figure 4.12 presents the responses of
consumption across different age groups to an expansionary monetary policy shock. The
model economy predicts that households in the bottom of the wealth distribution increase
total consumption while asset-rich households tend to decrease total consumption. As shown
in Figure 4.12, the first age group increases their consumption and older households (the
fourth and fifth quintiles) tend to reduce their consumption in response to an expansionary
monetary policy shock. Considering that older households are asset-rich while the young
cohorts own relatively less amount of wealth, the empirical result regarding the heterogeneous
43The CEX is rotating panel data where individuals are interviewed for four consecutive quarters at most.
44Anderson, Inoue and Rossi (2016) define non-durable consumption as expenditures on food, alcoholic
beverages, tobacco, utilities, personal care, household operations, public transportation, gas and motor oil,
and miscellaneous expense, and De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012) use food (including alcohol and tobacco),
heating fuel, public and private transport (including gasoline), and personal care as the non-durable con-
sumption.
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Figure 4.12: Response of Consumption across Age Quintiles
Note: The figure presents the responses of consumption across different age quintiles to an expansionary monetary policy shock.
Consumption is defined as non-durable consumption, and data for consumption are from the CEX 1980:Q1−2008:Q3.
behaviors of consumption across the age distribution is broadly consistent with the model
predictions.
This empirical finding is consistent with Doepke and Schneider (2006) and Wong (2018).
Doepke and Schneider (2006) quantitatively assess the effects of inflation through changes
in the value of nominal assets and find that rich and old households are main losers from
inflation. Similarly, Wong (2018) empirically estimates age-specific consumption responses
to monetary policy shocks and finds that consumption of younger people is more responsive.
4.5 The Impact of Inequality on the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
I next turn to the other main contribution of this paper: the role of the long-run level
of inequality in the effectiveness of monetary policy. What is the main linkage for the rela-
tion? To give a concrete answer to this question, I will take three steps. I first demonstrate
the relation between labor supply elasticity and the monetary policy effectiveness using the
representative-agent model. I then discuss how the long-run level of inequality determines
the labor supply elasticity in the model economy where indivisible labor is combined with
heterogeneous households. Finally, I integrate the long-run level of inequality and the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy by using labor supply elasticity as the main linkage for the
relation.
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Figure 4.13: Response of Key Variables for Different φ
Note: The figure shows the responses of key aggregate variables of two representative-agent economies with different values of
φ (φ = 1.14 and φ = 1.5) to expansionary monetary policy shocks.
4.5.1 Labor Supply Elasticity and Monetary Policy Effectiveness
Given the utility function, φ represents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of labor
supply or Frisch elasticity of labor supply.45 Hence, hours worked supplied by households will
be more sensitive to changes to wages with a larger value of φ. As discussed by Cho, Cooley
and Phaneuf (1997), the parameter φ also captures the attitude of households toward risk
with respect to labor supply: households are less risk averse with respect to hours worked with
a high value of φ.46 Since the wage contract generates a higher variation in labor supply, and
a degree of risk aversion with regard to labor supply depends on the labor supply elasticity
parameter, φ, households behave differently with different values of φ.
Based on the representative-agent models with nominal wage contracts, I demonstrate
the relation between labor supply elasticity and the monetary policy effectiveness. The
responses of key aggregate variables of two representative-agent economies with different
45The Frish elasticity captures the elasticity of hours worked to the wage rate for a constant marginal
utility of wealth. Hence, it measures a pure substitution effect of a wage change.
46Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf (1997) find that the welfare cost of nominal wage contract decreases as the
value of φ gets larger.
103
values of φ to monetary policy shocks are shown in Figure 4.13. As expected, a degree of
risk aversion with regard to labor supply matters for the effectiveness of monetary policy.
According to Figure 4.13, an economy with higher φ has more effective monetary policy in
terms of output. In response to a one-standard-deviation monetary policy (money growth)
shock, output increases by 0.15 percent when φ = 1.14 while it rises by 0.3 percent in the
economy where φ = 1.5. The main mechanism of the larger effectiveness of comes from the
interplay between a degree of risk aversion with regard to labor supply and the nominal
wage contract. Under the wage contract, households must work more than the equilibrium
level with an expansionary monetary shocks, which leads to a a decrease in welfare. With
a large degree of risk aversion or a small value of φ, households desire to consume more in
compensation for an increase in disutility caused by the wage contract, which implies that
save less. Since households save by accumulation assets and holding money, demand for
money increases by less than in the economy with a smaller degree of risk aversion, which
results in a smaller rise in price level. As found in Figure 4.13, the price increases by 0.13
percent when φ = 1.14 while it rises by 0.21 percent when φ = 1.5. A rise in price level has
the general equilibrium effect: it decreases real wages, and firms hire more workers. This
general equilibrium effect is larger in the economy with a smaller degree of risk aversion or
a larger value of φ.
4.5.2 Inequality and Labor Supply Elasticity
As found in Chang and Kim (2006) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), a degree of het-
erogeneity in an economy would affect aggregate labor supply elasticity. To be more specific,
reservation wages for households can be computed due to the indivisible labor supply as-
sumption in the heterogeneous-agent model. Using the reserve wages across households, the
model can endogenously generate different aggregate labor supply curves across the differ-
ent level of heterogeneity. Intuitively, less heterogeneity is associated with larger aggregate
labor supply elasticity. The mass of marginal workers47 matters will determine macro labor
47“A marginal worker” reservation wage is close to the market wage.
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supply elasticity in the economy. In the more equal economy, there would be more marginal
workers, which implies that labor supply elasticity in this society would be relatively large.
In other words, labor supply is more elastic for an economy with a small heterogeneity as
the reservation wage distribution is more concentrated.
To investigate the role on heterogeneity in aggregate labor supply elasticity, I consider
the model economy with less heterogeneity by decreasing the standard deviation of the id-
iosyncratic shock process, σx, to 0.230, which is 20 percent less than the benchmark value.
In the economy with less heterogeneity, Gini index for income and wealth reduce to 0.53
and 0.65, respectively, which are 0.59 and 0.68 in the benchmark economy (σx = 0.287).
The reservation-wage schedule and invariant distribution allows us to uncover the aggregate
labor-supply curve of the economy. Figure 4.14 reports the inverse cumulative distribu-
tions of reservation wages with corresponding participation rates for two different model
economies: the economies where σx = 0.287 and σx = 0.230. The solid lines represent the
benchmark economy (σx = 0.287) while the dotted lines show a counterfactual economy with
low inequality (σx = 0.230). Based on these reservation wage schedules, the responsiveness
of labor market participation can be computed. I calculate the elasticity at employment
rates of 60 percent, which is the steady state employment rate in both economies. For the
benchmark economy (σx = 0.287), the elasticity is 1.14 at the steady-state employment rate,
while it is 1.5 in the economy with a smaller degree of heterogeneity (σx = 0.230). Hence,
a more equal economy has a larger degree of labor supply elasticity, which implies that an
economy with less heterogeneity has a less disperse distribution of reservation wages.
4.5.3 The Role of Inequality in the Monetary Policy Effectiveness
Next, I investigate the role of long-run level of inequality in the effectiveness of monetary
policy. The main linkage between the long-run level of inequality and the effectiveness of
monetary policy is aggregate labor supply elasticity (or the shape of reservation wage distri-
bution). The intuitive explanation is as follows. Suppose that two economies with different
heterogeneities have a drop in real wages by the same amount in response to expansionary
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Figure 4.14: Labor Supply Curves with Different Heterogeneity
Note: The figure shows the inverse cumulative distributions of reservation wages with corresponding participation rates for two
different model economies: the economies where σx = 0.287 and σx = 0.230. The solid lines represent the benchmark economy
(σx = 0.287) while the dotted lines show a counterfactual economy with low inequality (σx = 0.230).
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monetary policy. As discussed earlier, a decrease in real factor prices for labor services al-
lows the firms to hire more workers, and households are employed in ascending order by their
reservation wage rates (per effective labor) until they provide the effective labor the firms
demand. Since a size of responsiveness of real wages is assumed to be identical, the effective
labor that the representative firm demands will be the same for the two economies. However,
decisions of credit goods will be different in the two economies. Larger labor supply elas-
ticity or a more concentrated reservation wage distribution means that a welfare difference
between employment and nonemployment is relatively small, and in turn households tend
to increase credit goods by less since disutility from involuntarily working is relatively small.
This implies that households in a low-inequality economy increase credit goods by less, and
this will lead to a rise in money demand as means of savings. An increase in money demand
results in a rise in price and a fall in real wages. Finally, labor demand will rise by more,
and this leads output to increase by more in the economy with less heterogeneity.
Figure 4.15 shows the responses of key aggregate variables of two model economies to
monetary policy shocks: the economies where σx = 0.287 and σx = 0.230. As expected, the
long-run level of inequality matters for the effectiveness of monetary policy. According to
Figure 4.15, a more equal society is associated with more effective monetary policy in terms of
output, ceteris paribus. Output increases more in the model economy with less heterogeneity
that those in the benchmark case: it increases by around 20 percent more than that in the
benchmark counterpart. As explained earlier, the main mechanism of the larger effectiveness
of comes from the shape of reservation wage distribution, which is represented by the labor
supply elasticity. A rise in money demand is larger in the model with less heterogeneity since
households in the low-inequality economy reduce their credit goods increase by less due to
smaller welfare costs induced by involuntary employment. This generates a larger increase
in the price level in the economy as shown in Figure 4.15. The higher inflation leads to a
bigger drop in real rental rate for labor services, and finally it makes the firms to demand
larger effective labor with more workers.
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Figure 4.15: Responses of Key Variables with Different Heterogeneity
Note: The figure shows the responses of key aggregate variables of two model economies to monetary policy shocks: the
economies where σx = 0.287 and σx = 0.230. The solid lines represent the benchmark economy (σx = 0.287) while the dotted
lines show a counterfactual economy with low inequality (σx = 0.230).
To sum up, different heterogeneity in the model economy generates a different level of
general equilibrium effects, and it finally affects the effectiveness of monetary policy: a more
equal economy has a larger effectiveness of monetary policy in terms of output responses.
4.5.4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I provide suggestive empirical evidence for the negative relation between
long-run inequality and the monetary policy effectiveness, by using state-level data with
national level policy variables.
4.5.4.1 Data
I use state-level data sets for inequality measures in the U.S. but consider national level
shocks. By using state-level data with common shocks, I can address two potential problems
that would occur in a country-level analysis: one is endogeneity problems due to consider-
able unobservable heterogeneity across countries, and the other is the normalization issue
induced by different sizes of country-level monetary policy shocks. A state-level panel with
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national shocks in this study helps solve these two issues to some extent since there might
be relatively less heterogeneity across states within a country, and common policy shocks
are automatically normalized across states since each state faces the identical shocks.
Data on income inequality are taken from Frank (2014), who constructs the inequality
measures by state using the pre-tax adjusted gross income published in the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). Frank (2014) computes various measures of income inequality, including the
relative mean deviation, Gini coefficient, Atkinson index, Theil’s entropy index, as well as
the top 1% and top 10% income shares. Among them, Gini coefficients are mainly used for
this study.
Regarding measures for monetary policy shocks, I use data constructed by Coibion et al.
(2017). These measures are a combination of the use of Greenbook forecasts and narra-
tive methods. Using narrative methods, Romer and Romer (2004) compute estimates of
variations in intended federal funds rate during Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meetings. They then regress the intended federal funds rate on the output and inflation fore-
casts in the Greenbook at each FOMC meeting date and use the residuals as the monetary
policy shocks. Based the method that Romer and Romer (2004) used, Coibion et al. (2017)
extend the shock measures until 2008.
4.5.4.2 Estimation I: Two-step Regression
In order to estimate the impact of the long-run level of inequality on the effectiveness of
monetary policy, I employ a two-step approach. In the first step, I consider a three-variable
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model including the monetary policy shock measure, federal
fund rates, and GDP for each state and to obtain the effect of monetary policy on output
for state i, denoted by δi. The second step is a cross-sectional estimation: I regress δi on a
measure for inequality which are long-run averages across time for each state, i.
Figure 4.16 shows the relation between the long-run level of inequality and the effective-
ness of monetary policy across states, where the effectiveness of monetary policy is measured
by the peak output response to expansionary monetary policy shocks, and the long-run level
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Figure 4.16: Inequality and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy I
Note: The figure depicts the relation between the long-run level of inequality and the effectiveness of monetary policy across
states, where the effectiveness of monetary policy is measured by the peak output response to expansionary monetary policy
shocks, and the long-run level of inequality is defined as the average of historical Gini income coefficients.
of inequality is defined as the average value of historical Gini income coefficients. As shown
in Figure 4.16, there is a negative relationship between inequality and the effectiveness of
monetary policy. The simple correlation between the two variables is -0.5. I regress the
effectiveness of monetary policy on the long-run level of inequality. According to Table 4.6,
the slop coefficient is negative and statistically significant: it is -0.18 and is significant at the
one percent level. This result is still robust even when I include the long-run level of GDP
per capita as a control variable following Brinca et al. (2016).
4.5.4.3 Estimation II: Local Projection Method with Dummy
As a robustness check, I also use local projection method proposed by Jorda (2005) to
estimate impulse response functions (IRFs).48 Local projection method has been increasingly
used in applied work and can easily be extended to estimate state-dependent effectiveness of
48Ramey and Zubairy (2018) use local projection method to estimate impulse responses and government
spending multipliers in the U.S., and Furceri, Loungani and Zdzienicka (2016) also study the effect of
monetary policy shocks on income inequality using the local projection method with a panel of 32 countries.
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Table 4.6: Inequality and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy I
Dependent Variable: Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
(1) (2)
Constant 0.1067∗∗∗ 0.2221∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0609)
Gini Coefficient -0.1824∗∗∗ -0.1658∗∗∗
(0.0619) (0.0540)
GDP Per Capita -0.0122∗∗
(0.0053)
Observation 50 50
R-squared 0.23 0.34
Note: The table shows the regression results for the relation between the long-run level of inequality and the effectiveness
of monetary policy across states, where the effectiveness of monetary policy is measured by the peak output response to
expansionary monetary policy shocks, and the long-run level of inequality is defined as the average of historical income Gini
coefficients. Values in ( ) are White’s robust standard errors. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. Per-capita GDPs are logged values.
economic policies (e.g., ?). To be more specific, the local projection method for panel data
simply estimates a series of regressions for each horizon j:
yi,t+j = αi,j + IHi,t−1βH,j[Shockt + γH,jxi,t] + ILi,t−1βL,j[Shockt + γL,jxi,t] + εi,t+j (4.12)
where j = 0, 2, ..., J, y is logged GDP, α is state fixed effects which can control for
unobserved cross-state heterogeneity, Shock is monetary policy shocks, and x is a vector of
control variables. x includes lagged policy shocks and lagged y. IRFs of y at time t+j to the
shock at time t can be obtained using the estimated coefficient βH,j and βL,j. IHi,t−1(ILi,t−1)
represents a high(low)-inequality state for each state i at time t − 1. I use IHi,t−1 in the
regression rather than IHi,t since monetary policy at time t can affect inequality at time t. I
set IHi,t−1(ILi,t−1) = 1 when a state i is one of the top (bottom) 10 states among 50 states in
terms of the income Gini coefficient at time t−1 while IHi,t−1(ILi,t−1) = 0 otherwise. Hence, βH,j
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Figure 4.17: Inequality and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy II
Note: The red line (the blue line with circles) shows the response of output to an expansionary monetary policy shock for the
low (high) inequality states, and the gray thick solid line represents the unconditional response of output in the linear model.
Newey-West standard errors are used, and 68% confidence intervals are shown with shaded area.
is the coefficient associated with the high-inequality states for a horizon j while βL,j captures
the effects of the shock for low-inequality state for a horizon j. Two complications associated
with the local projection method in the panel study is (i) covariance structures that vary
by a certain characteristic and (ii) the serial correlation in the error terms induced by the
successive leading of the dependent variable. In order to address the first issue, I have to use
clustered robust standard errors, but the number of clusters is too small. Hence, I decide
not to use clustered robust standard errors for the benchmark estimation, but the results
with those error are also reported in the appendix and are still robust. For the second issue,
I use standard errors with Newey-West correction, which is a standard correction method
for the serial correlation problem in the literature.
The estimated responses of GDP to expansionary monetary policy shocks for states of
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high and low inequality are reported in Figure 4.17. The results of this exercise show that
monetary policy shocks have much larger impacts on output during states of low inequality
than high inequality. The effects of monetary policy shocks are negative on impact during
states of high inequality, while the on-impact responses are positive when the economy is
experiencing low inequality. There are statistically significant differences between the re-
sponses of output for high- and low-inequality states in one and two years after the shocks.
Hence, the effects of expansionary monetary policy shocks on GDP in the linear estimation
model (the thick solid line) are largely driven by low-inequality states. This empirical results
provide supportive evidence that a more equal society is associated with more effective mon-
etary policy in terms of output. The empirical finding is broadly consistent with those in the
literature on the effectiveness of economic policy and inequality or indebtedness. Yang (2017)
investigates the relationship between income inequality and the local government spending
multipliers using rich historical state-level data on military procurement and inequality. He
finds that the effects of government spending shocks on output are larger in low-inequality
states than in high-inequality states. Alpanda and Zubairy (2017) also provide empirical ev-
idence that the effects of monetary policy are less powerful during periods of high household
debt. Similarly, Voinea, Lovin and Cojocaru (2018) find that lower inequality is associated
with stronger effectiveness and higher homogeneity of monetary policy transmission.
4.6 Conclusion
This study investigates the relation between monetary policy and inequality by asking
how one affects the other: the effect of monetary policy on inequality and the role of the
long-run level of inequality in the effectiveness of monetary policy. To this end, I develop
a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which incorporate nominal
wage contracts and cash-in-advance constraints into a heterogeneous agent model economy
with indivisible labor. Two main findings emerge: monetary policy affects inequality in the
short run, and inequality matters for the effectiveness of monetary policy in the long run.
In regards to the first main finding, an unexpected monetary expansion decrease inequal-
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ity. An expansionary monetary policy shocks leads to a fall in real wages due to the nominal
wage contract, and this allows firms to hire more workers. A rise in employment from the
bottom of distributions reduces inequality. There are heterogeneous effects of a monetary
expansion on income and consumption across wealth distribution. Wealth-richer households
benefit from a rise in the real asset returns while households at the bottom of the wealth
distribution benefit from an increase in employment in a relative sense. Asset-poor house-
holds tend to increase consumption whereas consumption for wealthy households falls, which
implies that inflation hurts rich households more.
As far as the second main finding is concerned, a more equal economy tends to have
more effective monetary policy. The size of aggregate labor supply elasticity, which depends
on a degree of heterogeneity in an economy, affects the responses of prices and real wages
to monetary policy shocks. In an economy with less heterogeneity, the effects of monetary
policy shocks on price and real wages will be larger, which leads to a bigger response of
output.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation investigates inequality, business cycles, and macroeconomic policies.
First, I study the quantitative implications of real wage rigidities and heterogeneity for
the two long-standing puzzles in the business cycles literature, the weak comovement of
hours worked with labor productivity and the large cyclical movement in the labor wedge.
I shed light on these issues by extending a heterogeneous-agent model with an indivisible
labor supply choice to real wage rigidities.
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. I find that the correlation
coefficient between hours and productivity decreases, and the volatility of the labor wedge
increases when the index of wage stickiness or the length of wage contracts increases. Hetero-
geneity also plays a role in solving the two puzzles since heterogeneity allows the aggregate
labor supply curve to move in response to aggregate productivity shocks and the wedge to
be endogenously produced. From these results, I argue that a small amount of real wage
stickiness would be sufficient to resolve both anomalies when long-term wage contracts and
heterogeneity are taken into account.
Second, I uncover why consumers behave differently in response to a government spending
shock. To this end, I construct a heterogeneous agent model economy which incorporates
a progressive taxation scheme, productive government expenditure, and indivisible labor. I
find that the model economy successfully replicates the different responses of consumption
between the bottom and the top of income distribution to government spending shocks.
When the government increases its spending accompanied with a rise in tax progressivity,
poor households are employed and hence increase their consumption due to an increase
in after-tax wage rates while the rich decrease consumption since the effect of productive
government spending cannot fully offset a significant increase in tax rates.
Existing theoretical macroeconomic models inspired by Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles
(2007) suggest that credit-constrained consumers are crucial to account for why government
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spending shocks have substantially different effects on consumers. On the other hand, this
study proposes a new perspective by suggesting that it is important to consider different tax
burdens across consumers when studying the distributional effects of government spending
shocks.
Third, I investigate the relation between monetary policy and inequality by asking how
one affects the other: the effect of monetary policy on inequality and the role of the long-
run level of inequality in the effectiveness of monetary policy. To this end, I develop a
simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which incorporate nominal
wage contracts and cash-in-advance constraints into a heterogeneous agent model economy
with indivisible labor. Two main findings emerge: monetary policy affects inequality in the
short run, and inequality matters for the effectiveness of monetary policy in the long run.
In regards to the first main finding, an unexpected monetary expansion decrease inequal-
ity. An expansionary monetary policy shocks leads to a fall in real wages due to the nominal
wage contract, and this allows firms to hire more workers. A rise in employment from the
bottom of distributions reduces inequality. There are heterogeneous effects of a monetary
expansion on income and consumption across wealth distribution. Wealth-richer households
benefit from a rise in the real asset returns while households at the bottom of the wealth
distribution benefit from an increase in employment in a relative sense. Asset-poor house-
holds tend to increase consumption whereas consumption for wealthy households falls, which
implies that inflation hurts rich households more.
As far as the second main finding is concerned, a more equal economy tends to have
more effective monetary policy. The size of aggregate labor supply elasticity, which depends
on a degree of heterogeneity in an economy, affects the responses of prices and real wages
to monetary policy shocks. In an economy with less heterogeneity, the effects of monetary
policy shocks on price and real wages will be larger, which leads to a bigger response of
output.
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